

# Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

26 June 2026

English only

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## Second Preparatory Meeting for the Third Review Conference

Geneva, 1 July 2026

Item 5 (a) of the provisional agenda

Review of the operation and status of the Convention 2021-2026

### Draft Review Document on the implementation of the Lausanne Action Plan (2022-2026) and the status and operation of the Convention

This updated draft Review Document is issued by the Presidency to advance structured consideration of progress under the Convention in preparations for the Third Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, following discussions during the First Preparatory Meeting and written submissions by States and stakeholders. It takes stock of key developments to date, highlights emerging challenges, and identifies areas for strengthening implementation across the period under review.

A consolidated version will be submitted to the Third Review Conference in early July. Until then, States and other stakeholders may provide further input. Written comments may be submitted to the CCM ISU at [implementation@cmconvention.org](mailto:implementation@cmconvention.org) with copy to the President's Team at [ccmpresident3rc@nra.gov.la](mailto:ccmpresident3rc@nra.gov.la).

## I. Introduction and objective

1. The Convention on Cluster Munitions<sup>1</sup> (CCM) was established to end, for all time, the suffering caused by cluster munitions. It sets out comprehensive prohibitions on their use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and transfer, alongside key positive obligations.
2. These include clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants, stockpile destruction, risk education, and victim assistance for survivors, their families, and affected communities. The Convention also underscores the importance of international cooperation and assistance, recognising that effective implementation depends on sustained collaboration and adequate resources.
3. Since its entry into force on 1 August 2010, the CCM has made significant progress and remains a major achievement in international humanitarian and disarmament law, reflecting sustained commitment by States Parties through cooperation and collective action.
4. Since the Second Review Conference-2RC (2020–2021), progress has continued alongside growing challenges, including slower accession rates, the first withdrawal of a State Party, and increased use, transfer, and production of cluster munitions by States not party, resulting in new casualties. The evolving humanitarian and geopolitical context calls for renewed collective action to strengthen implementation and universalisation.
5. This document reviews progress under the Lausanne Action Plan since the 2RC and identifies emerging challenges to inform preparations for the Third Review Conference and the next Action Plan

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<sup>1</sup> Herein after the “CCM” or “the Convention”



## II. Guiding Principles

### A. Status, progress and evaluation of Actions 1-9 since the adoption of the LAP

6. The Guiding Principles of the LAP<sup>2</sup> continued to guide implementation across all pillars of the Convention. They reinforce national ownership, inclusivity, sustainability, and integration of CCM implementation into broader humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding frameworks.

7. States Parties have increasingly integrated implementation into national policy frameworks, including development, humanitarian response, and peacebuilding strategies. Progress has also been observed in strengthening national capacities and allocating domestic resources.

8. The number of States Parties integrating CCM implementation into broader national frameworks increased from zero to seven. Reporting on strengthened national capacities increased from twelve to fifteen, indicating gradual institutional consolidation.

9. The number of States Parties adopting comprehensive national strategies increased from four to nine, while those adopting annual workplans increased from zero to ten, reflecting improved planning structures.

10. International cooperation and assistance remained stable, with an average of 23 States Parties providing support annually. Approximately nine provided multi-year assistance, reflecting increased predictability.

11. Progress was recorded in promoting inclusive implementation, including gender- and age-sensitive approaches. However, meaningful participation of victims remains limited in practice. Nine States Parties reported inclusive strategies involving victims or affected communities, while only one included victims in official delegations.

12. Adoption of national mine action standards aligned with IMAS increased from zero to nine States Parties, reflecting strengthened technical capacity.

13. Reporting on national information management systems increased from zero to ten States Parties, improving data collection and operational planning

14. Only four States Parties reported systematic integration of CCM implementation into broader humanitarian, development, or environmental frameworks. Linkages between clearance outcomes and development impacts remain insufficiently documented

15. Environmental considerations are increasingly reflected in mine action practice. The adoption of IMAS 07.13 (2024) and Technical Note 07.13/01 (2025) has supported the integration of environmental protection considerations into planning and implementation. Peru, for example, integrated environmental considerations during the destruction of its cluster munitions stockpiles in 2023 to reduce environmental impacts. Further developments were reflected in a working paper presented at the 13MSP by Italy and France.<sup>3</sup>

16. Financial sustainability remains mixed. An average of 31 States Parties paid assessed contributions in advance of MSP meetings, while approximately 61 contributed annually to the ISU budget. However, late and partial payments continue to affect predictability.

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<sup>2</sup> In the current version of this document, the figures related to the implementation of the LAP primarily reflect the period between the 10MSP to 12MSP. Updated data will be reflected in the 2026 Progress Report which is currently under preparation. At the time of drafting, the ISU is still receiving Article 7 transparency reports, which may be submitted until 30 April 2026.

<sup>3</sup> CCM/MSP/2025/11

## B. Challenges and opportunities emerged since the 2RC

17. Implementation of the Guiding Principles varies across thematic areas. While political commitment remains strong, operational integration across humanitarian, development, and human rights frameworks remains uneven.

18. National capacity constraints and funding limitations continue to be among the most significant challenges, affecting full implementation of national strategies, sustainability and national ownership.

19. Meaningful participation of victims and affected communities remains inconsistent, despite strong policy-level support.

20. Strengthening institutional mechanisms and resource availability will be necessary to ensure full operationalisation of the Guiding Principles across all areas of implementation.

## III. Universalization

### A. Status of the situation and progress since the adoption of the LAP

21. To date, **124 States** have committed to the Convention: **112 States Parties and 12 signatories**. The signatories are: eight in Africa (Angola, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Kenya, Liberia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania), two in the Americas (Haiti, Jamaica), one in Asia (Indonesia), and one in Europe (Cyprus).

22. Since the 2RC, three States joined the Convention: Nigeria (ratification, 2023), South Sudan (accession, 2023), and Vanuatu (accession, 2025).


23. During the 13MSP cycle, Lithuania withdrew from the Convention, effective 6 March 2025, marking the first withdrawal under a humanitarian disarmament treaty.

24. 13 States not party are affected by cluster munitions: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Iran, Libya, Serbia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Viet Nam, and Yemen.

### B. Evaluation against Actions 10-11 and objectives set forth in the LAP

25. Under Action 10, universalization has been promoted through international fora, notably the annual UNGA resolution on the Convention (A/RES/80/52), tabled since 2014. The resolution reflects continued engagement with the Convention and concern over cluster munition use and humanitarian impacts. Voting patterns show sustained support: 144–148 votes in favour (2021–2023, peak 148 in 2023), a decline to 121 (2024), and 138 (2025) with 2 against and 35 abstentions.

26. Twenty States not party regularly supported the resolution, including Algeria, Armenia, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, China, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Honduras, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malaysia, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Suriname, and Thailand. Others, including Kiribati and Yemen, supported it intermittently.




27. Presidencies and coordinators continued universalization outreach through bilateral meetings, communications, and engagement with signatories and non-parties to encourage accession and address challenges.

28. Outreach activities included regional and thematic workshops for Arab, African, Commonwealth, South-East Asian, and Pacific States, as well as parliamentary engagement through the IPU. In total, 25 universalization-related events were held (6 Africa, 4 Asia, 2 Caribbean, 2 Arab region, 11 global).

29. Following Lithuania's withdrawal, States Parties expressed regret and concern over implications for humanitarian disarmament norms and treaty integrity, and reiterated readiness for dialogue and re-accession.

30. Participation of States not party in MSPs continued, with 71 States<sup>4</sup> attending as observers since entry into force, including 12 signatories.



31. No formal Article 8 compliance concerns were raised during the period.

32. Allegations of transfer or transit of cluster munitions through States Parties prompted concern. States Parties reaffirmed the absolute prohibition on transfer and stressed the importance of assessing such allegations.

33. Reports of use of cluster munitions by States not party<sup>5</sup> and non-State actors, including on the territory of a State Party, were strongly condemned. States Parties reiterated that such use causes unacceptable humanitarian harm, particularly to civilians and children.

34. According to available information, **17 States not party** continue to produce or reserve the right to produce cluster munitions, including Brazil, the People's Republic of China, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Israel, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Myanmar, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Türkiye<sup>6</sup>, and the United States. The United States is also reported to have transferred cluster munitions to Ukraine between July 2023 and April 2024.

35. Some States not party have adopted restrictions or moratoria on cluster munitions, though information on such measures remains incomplete and not systematically tracked

<sup>4</sup> Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Angola\*, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Central African Republic\*, Peoples Republic of China, Democratic Republic of Congo\*, Cyprus\*, Djibouti\*, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Greece, Haiti\*, Indonesia\*, Iran, Jamaica\*, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya\*, Kiribati, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liberia\*, Libya, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Republic of Tanzania\*, Thailand, Timor Leste, Türkiye, Turkmenistan, Uganda\*, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe (\*=signatories).

<sup>5</sup> Russian Federation, Ukraine, Myanmar, and Syria

<sup>6</sup> Türkiye underscores that such production has ceased.


## C. Challenges and opportunities emerged since the 2RC

36. Since the 2RC, universalization has continued, though at an uneven pace. Progress broadly reflects trends in other arms control instruments and underscores the need for sustained engagement.
37. Prioritised engagement with the 12 signatory States remains essential. Voting patterns in UNGA resolutions may indicate openness to accession, as seen in cases such as Nigeria, South Sudan, and Vanuatu prior to joining.
38. Limited awareness among decision-makers, including parliamentarians, continues to delay accession processes.
39. Broader geopolitical tensions, competing national priorities, and global crises, including climate and humanitarian challenges, have affected accession dynamics.
40. Some States cite security concerns as a barrier to accession. Continued engagement under Article 21 remains essential to address these concerns while reaffirming the humanitarian objectives of the Convention, maintaining dialogue, including military-to-military exchanges and sharing of implementation experience.
41. Many States not party continue to engage in related humanitarian disarmament and development initiatives, reflecting partial alignment with Convention objectives.
42. Regional initiatives may support universalization by addressing context-specific concerns and facilitating dialogue.
43. MSPs have consistently reaffirmed condemnation of cluster munition use by any actor, reinforcing normative clarity under Article 1 over interpretative ambiguity under Article 21.
44. The Convention's institutional structure, including Presidencies and coordinators, continues to support continuity in universalization efforts. The Universalization Working Group remains an important platform for sustained engagement.

## IV. Stockpile Destruction

### A. Status, progress and evaluation of Actions 12-17 since the adoption of the LAP

45. States Parties have destroyed nearly 1.5 million cluster munitions and 179 million submunitions. Implementation of Article 3 remains one of the Convention's most significant achievements, directly eliminating future risks to civilians and reinforcing the global norm against cluster munitions. Article 7 reports since the 10MSP show sustained progress in stockpile destruction, alongside emerging implementation considerations.
46. As of mid-2026, all 41 States Parties with stockpile obligations have completed destruction and declared compliance, including 15 States Parties prior to entry into force. Afghanistan completed destruction of known stockpiles in 2014 and later eliminated newly identified residual items through EOD operations. Italy reported destruction in April 2024 of stockpiles transferred from Bulgaria under Article 3(7). The final States Parties to complete obligations were Bulgaria and Slovakia (2023), followed by Peru and South Africa (2024).
47. These achievements reflect full implementation of Actions 12–13, including environmentally responsible destruction methods consistent with international standards and supported by measures to minimise environmental impact.



48. Under Action 14, States Parties demonstrated continued transparency in addressing previously unknown stockpiles. The United Kingdom reported discovery and complete destruction of such stockpiles in 2021.

49. By the 13MSP, **10 States Parties** retained cluster munitions under Article 3(6): Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.

50. Reporting shows continued limited use of retained items for permitted purposes. Germany and Sweden reported use for EOD training in 2024, resulting in reductions. France reported acquisition and use of one submunition for neutralisation research. Six States Parties reported no reductions during the period.

51. The 12MSP welcomed Belgium's decision to eliminate all previously retained cluster munitions, no longer considering them necessary for training. States Parties reiterated that retention under Article 3(6) must remain strictly limited to the minimum necessary, with transparency and continued dialogue essential to ensure consistency with the Convention and Action 17 of the LAP.

52. By the 13MSP, Denmark reported national funding for destruction of retained munitions, while Cameroon requested international assistance, which had not yet been provided.

## B. Challenges and Opportunities Emerged since the 2RC

53. Concerns persist regarding limited reporting by some States Parties on retained munitions under Article 3(6), including quantities and permitted uses, limiting full transparency.

54. Risks remain from large stockpiles held by States not party, which may undermine the Convention's norm, particularly through transfer or use. The 13MSP noted concerns about broader humanitarian disarmament implications, including following the withdrawal of one State Party.

55. Sustained attention is required to ensure retained munitions remain strictly limited, reported transparently, and used only for permitted purposes, including in view of possible future accessions.

56. Good practices on minimising retained stocks and improving transparency should be further promoted as standard practice, ensuring retention remains strictly limited to operational necessity.

57. Future challenges may arise from discovery of previously unknown stockpiles, requiring robust national procedures, preparedness mechanisms, and continued technical support from experienced States Parties.

## V. Survey and Clearance

### A. Status of the situation, progress and evaluation against Actions 18-26 of the LAP

58. Survey and clearance of cluster munition remnants remain central to the humanitarian objectives of the Convention, contributing to civilian protection, safe land use, and sustainable development. The LAP includes nine dedicated actions on survey and clearance, reflecting their importance. Progress reports show advances in methodologies and outputs, alongside persistent challenges requiring sustained attention.

59. By the 13MSP, ten (10) States Parties continued to have obligations under Article 4. During the review period, one (1) State Party reported completion of its Article 4 obligations, while thirteen (13) extension requests were submitted between the 10MSP and 13MSP, of which three (3) were a second request during the reporting period<sup>7</sup>.

60. As of mid-2026, twenty-eight (28) States Parties have at some point had Article 4 obligations. Of these, eighteen (18) have completed clearance since entry into force. Several States Parties reported improved survey outcomes enabling more precise identification of contamination and better planning of clearance operations.

61. By the 3RC, ten (10) States Parties are expected to retain outstanding obligations: Afghanistan, Chad, Chile, Germany, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Somalia, and South Sudan.

62. Action 18 calls on States Parties to identify the location, scope, and extent of contamination and establish accurate baselines. The 11MSP reaffirmed this, including the importance of marking and fencing hazardous areas where feasible.

63. Most affected States Parties have undertaken survey activities contributing to more reliable contamination data. At least eight (8) States Parties—Afghanistan, Chad, Chile, Germany, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Lebanon—reported completion of baseline surveys. South Sudan reported initial survey activity in 2024 and progress in 2025. At least eight (8) States Parties also reported marking hazardous areas.

64. There is increased use of evidence-based survey methodologies, including non-technical and technical survey, improving the precision of contamination estimates and enabling more efficient resource allocation. This shift is widely reported as a key LAP achievement, though documentation of broader socio-economic impacts remains limited.

65. Survey and clearance outcomes are assessed through:

- (a) area released through survey or clearance;
- (b) contribution to safety and freedom of movement; and
- (c) quality of information exchange among stakeholders.

66. Under Action 19, affected States Parties are encouraged to develop multi-year, costed national strategies. Reporting increased from eight (8) States Parties to nine (9), indicating gradual strengthening of planning frameworks.

67. Extension requests (including Chad 2024, Somalia 2025, Mauritania 2025) have improved in quality and alignment with Action 20. Recommendations from the Ad hoc Analysis Group are increasingly reflected, including in cases constrained by funding limitations

<sup>7</sup> Three at 10MSP (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Chile); two at 11MSP (Iraq and Mauritania); three at 12MSP (Germany, Lao PDR, Chad); and five at 13MSP (Afghanistan, Chile, Lebanon, Mauritania, and Somalia)

68. Guidelines adopted at the 8MSP and the Ad hoc Analysis Group have strengthened the quality and consistency of extension request review, supported by technical input from UN agencies, the ICRC, the CMC, GICHD, and operational experts.

69. Delays in meeting Article 4 deadlines remain a concern. Where extension is required, it should be limited to the shortest feasible period, based on realistic, evidence-based completion plans with clear milestones and budgets.

70. Under Action 21, innovation in survey and clearance methods and alignment with IMAS has increased. Reporting rose from one (1) State Party at the 10MSP to five (5) by the 13MSP. Several States Parties also integrate SDGs and environmental considerations, including through IMAS 7.13 on environmental management and climate risk.

71. Environmental considerations received increased attention. A working paper by the Coordinators highlighted climate risks and environmental impacts on survey and clearance. Climate change can affect safety, access, and contamination patterns, including through flooding, erosion, and extreme weather. These factors underline the need for integrated environmental and climate risk assessments in planning.

72. Under Action 22, reporting on sustainable national capacity for residual contamination increased from four (4) States Parties at the 10MSP to ten (10) by the 13MSP.

73. Under Action 23, progress remains mixed. Reporting on age- and gender-sensitive approaches increased from three (3) States Parties at the 10MSP to nine (9) by the 13MSP. However, integration of broader SDG-related planning remains limited, with only three (3) States Parties reporting such alignment.

74. Innovative cooperation mechanisms, including country coalitions, continue to develop. Examples include Lao PDR's UXO Sector Working Group and Lebanon's Mine Action Forum, both supporting structured coordination between national authorities, donors, and operators.

75. Clearance achievements during the review period demonstrate sustained national and partner capacity and continued operational progress in addressing contamination.

## **B. Challenges and opportunities emerged since the 2RC**

76. While improvements made in survey and clearance outputs and methodologies, persistent challenges remain, including the need for more precise contamination data and sustained operational planning.

77. Delays in clearance continue to be reported due to insecurity, difficult terrain, funding shortfalls, and discovery of previously unknown contamination. These factors affect both pace and predictability of implementation.

78. Some States Parties, including Bosnia and Herzegovina and Mauritania, have reported inconsistencies in contamination data reporting, reflecting capacity and funding constraints. This underscores the need for strengthened national systems.

79. Variations in reporting quality limit global analysis and resource prioritisation. While some States provide detailed technical data, others provide only general narrative updates.

80. Funding constraints continue to affect operations, resulting in reduced capacity, delays, or prioritisation of limited areas. Remaining contamination continues to pose risks to affected populations and reinforces the need for climate-informed planning and sustainable funding.

81. A key institutional development was the separation of survey and clearance and risk education into distinct agenda items, reflecting the LAP structure and enabling more focused discussion of obligations.

## VI. Risk Education

### A. Status of the situation, progress and evaluation of actions 27-30 of the LAP

82. In 2024, risk education was established as a distinct agenda item within the MSP framework through the designation of a dedicated Coordinator, reflecting its growing professionalization and strategic importance. This change aligns with the LAP structure distinguishing survey and clearance from risk education. Lao PDR served as Coordinator during the 13MSP cycle, followed by Lebanon in 2025.

83. Risk education continues to play a critical protective role, particularly in contexts of high casualty rates or where survey and clearance are constrained by insecurity or active hostilities. In such settings, it remains a primary measure to reduce exposure to explosive hazards and promote safer behaviour.

84. During the review period, efforts led by the GICHD and States Parties strengthened the strategic profile of risk education, including a 2025 workshop to share experiences and good practices. The discussions highlighted increasing State leadership, innovation, and the importance of context-specific approaches and resource mobilisation

85. Since the 2RC, ten (10) affected States Parties Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Chile, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Somalia, and South Sudan have reported annually on risk education activities.

86. Under Action 27, integration of risk education into national strategies increased from eight (8) States Parties in 2022 to ten (10) by the 12MSP and 13MSP cycles, indicating improved policy coherence. Some non-affected States, including Colombia, Cuba, and Peru, also reported awareness-raising activities, reflecting recognition of risk education as a preventive measure beyond contaminated areas.

87. Under Action 28, nine (9) of ten (10) affected States Parties consistently reported tailored risk education, with a temporary drop to six (6) in 2022. These figures confirm sustained delivery of context-specific approaches. Some States also reported targeted international support for time-sensitive activities, including France's Crisis and Support Centre during the 13MSP cycle.

88. Under Action 29, reporting on disaggregated data increased from five (5) States Parties in 2022 to seven (7) by the 13MSP. Reporting on impact-oriented measures rose from zero (0) to five (5), indicating gradual progress toward outcome-based approaches.

89. Despite improvements, reporting remains uneven. Many submissions remain descriptive, with limited systematic disaggregation by age, sex, disability, or geography, constraining assessment of reach and effectiveness among at-risk populations.

90. Under Action 30, all affected States Parties reported reference to residual contamination by the 13MSP, reflecting increased recognition of the need to sustain risk education beyond clearance, including in residual risk environments.

### B. Challenges and opportunities emerged since the 2RC

91. Risk education remains a core humanitarian pillar and is often the primary civilian protection measure in active conflict contexts. It also contributes to broader humanitarian-development-peace linkages and supports rights-based approaches in affected settings.

92. The establishment of a dedicated Coordinator marked a significant step in strengthening institutional focus, providing a platform for coordination, good practice exchange, and improved visibility of risk education within Convention implementation.

93. Affected States Parties consistently report delivery of risk education in high-risk communities, contributing to increased awareness and behavioural change, and in some

contexts, reduced accidents. Increasing attention is also being given to adapting approaches for persons with disabilities, though this remains uneven.

94. A key challenge remains measuring impact. Reporting is often activity-based, with limited evidence on behavioural change or accident reduction. Strengthening outcome-focused monitoring, including disaggregated data and community feedback, would improve effectiveness assessment.

95. Funding constraints continue to affect implementation, with several States Parties reporting insufficient or unpredictable resources. Dependence on external support in some contexts raises concerns regarding sustainability and national ownership, particularly where risk education is integrated without dedicated budgets.

96. Some innovation is emerging, including the use of digital tools, social media, and tailored messaging. However, documentation and sharing of good practices remain limited, reducing opportunities for replication

97. National coordination remains uneven. While some States Parties have strong coordination mechanisms, others rely on fragmented implementation, leading to inefficiencies and gaps. Strengthening integration within broader mine action and protection frameworks remains important.

## **VII. Victim Assistance**

### **A. Status of the situation, progress and evaluation of Actions 31-37 of the LAP**

98. The CCM is the first disarmament treaty establishing explicit obligations on victim assistance. These obligations apply to victims under the jurisdiction or control of States Parties, including survivors, families of those killed or injured, and affected communities. Victim assistance is a core humanitarian and human rights commitment aimed at addressing long-term harm and supporting full and inclusive participation in society.

99. States Parties have strengthened their understanding of victim assistance needs through improved data collection, consolidation, and analysis under Action 31. Reporting and international cooperation have progressively refined the evidence base on casualties and needs, contributing to more targeted responses.

100. States Parties reaffirmed their commitment to access to medical care, rehabilitation, mental health and psychosocial support, socio-economic inclusion, and protection of victims' rights.

101. Under Action 32, States Parties reaffirmed the importance of full, equal, and effective participation of victims in society, and the integration of victim assistance into broader frameworks, including disability rights and other relevant social, economic, and cultural rights. The CRPD remains the key normative framework, while ensuring attention to the specific needs of cluster munition survivors, families, and affected communities.

102. A stable group of twelve (12) States Parties Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Croatia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Montenegro, Somalia, and South Sudan—reported cluster munition victims under their jurisdiction or control. All have designated national focal points, and nine (9) have national action plans (Action 33).

103. Most concerned States Parties reported provision of emergency and ongoing medical care (Action 34), alongside strengthened rehabilitation services and age- and gender-sensitive mental health and psychosocial support.

104. Under Action 35, reporting on socio-economic inclusion increased from seven (7) States Parties in earlier cycles to nine (9) by 2025, reflecting growing recognition of its importance.

105. Under Action 36, reporting on victim participation in policy development increased from six (6) States Parties in 2022 to nine (9) in 2025. However, victim participation in delegations to MSPs remains limited, indicating the need for further strengthening.

106. Under Action 37, eight (8) States Parties reported training of victim assistance professionals. All concerned States Parties confirmed assistance is provided by qualified personnel.

107. Several States Parties provided updated reporting during the review cycle, improving continuity and understanding of national efforts and evolving implementation.

108. States Parties also reported ongoing resource mobilisation, including national funding and international cooperation, underscoring the importance of sustained financing for victim assistance.

109. A key development was the ratification of the CRPD by Lebanon and South Sudan. All States Parties with cluster munition victims are now Parties to the CRPD, strengthening alignment between victim assistance and broader disability rights frameworks.

## **B. Challenges and opportunities emerged since the 2RC**

110. Victim assistance remains a central pillar and a defining feature of its humanitarian framework, with the most comprehensive obligations in humanitarian disarmament.

111. While commitment remains strong, implementation varies across contexts, reflecting differences in national capacity, systems, and resources.

112. States Parties continue to integrate victim assistance into disability, health, and social protection frameworks. Increased emphasis is placed on rights-based, survivor-centred, and gender- and age-sensitive approaches aligned with the CRPD.

113. A key challenge remains translating commitments into measurable outcomes. Reporting often remains descriptive, with limited data on impact. Strengthening monitoring, evaluation, and outcome-oriented reporting remains necessary.

114. Expanding expectations of victim assistance, combined with increased demand in conflict-affected contexts, has increased pressure on national systems. This raises challenges related to prioritisation, sequencing, and sustainability, particularly where capacity and funding are limited.

115. Resource constraints continue to shape implementation. Victim assistance relies on a combination of national and international funding, highlighting the need for predictable support and stronger integration into national systems and development frameworks.

116. Survivor participation is increasingly recognised but remains largely consultative. Strengthening meaningful participation, including through better linkage with CRPD mechanisms, could enhance inclusion while complementing CCM-specific reporting and accountability.

## **VIII. International Cooperation and Assistance**

### **A. Status of the situation, progress and evolution of Actions 38–42 of the LAP**

117. At the 2RC, States Parties reaffirmed the central role of international cooperation and assistance in implementing the Convention. Through Actions 38–42 of the LAP, they emphasised strengthened partnerships among States Parties and with international and civil society actors to support implementation.

118. Over the review period, cooperation and assistance continued across clearance, victim assistance, risk education and institutional capacity. Engagement levels varied, but reporting confirms that cooperation remained integral to implementation for many States Parties.

119. Under Action 38, the number of States Parties committing national resources remained broadly stable, with between fourteen (14) and fifteen (15) States Parties reporting such contributions during the 13MSP cycle, indicating gradual but limited progress in domestic resource allocation.

120. National contributions varied significantly. Germany reported full national funding; Iraq, Lebanon and Bosnia and Herzegovina partial coverage; and Lao PDR, Mauritania and Chad limited resources. Chile and Somalia reported no direct financial contributions. Some States Parties, including Chad and Mauritania, reported funding declines, underscoring continued reliance on international support for most affected States Parties

121. Under Action 39, sixteen (16) States Parties reported sharing practices, experiences and lessons learned, reflecting stable engagement in peer exchange and cooperation.

122. Reciprocated cooperation peaked at forty-three (43) States Parties during the 10MSP cycle and subsequently stabilised. However, reduced assistance flows and limited awareness of emerging issues may affect cooperation in areas such as environmental and climate-related impacts

123. Operational contexts have become more complex due to reduced development assistance and competing global priorities. Stakeholder dialogues highlighted pressures on victim assistance, risk education, clearance funding, and broader humanitarian-development linkages, including environmental and peacebuilding considerations.

124. In survey and clearance, reporting on experience-sharing increased from two (2) States Parties in 2022 to thirteen (13) by the 13MSP. While the LAP does not include a specific indicator on clearance funding, external sources indicate declining support. Except for Germany, all Article 4 extension requests cited insufficient funding as a key factor.

125. Under Action 41, limited progress was reported in developing comprehensive national plans to strengthen ownership and integrate SDGs, with fewer than three (3) States Parties reporting such efforts in any cycle. Reporting remains largely input-focused, with limited evidence on outcomes, particularly for victim assistance and sustainability of national systems.

126. Under Action 42, no new financing mechanisms were reported. The country coalition approach in Lao PDR illustrated a structured donor–State dialogue model, though only two (2) States Parties reported its use. Lebanon also applied a similar mechanism informally.

127. Cooperation continued through a wide range of actors, including South–South and triangular cooperation, UN agencies, the ICRC, IFRC, GICHD, CMC, civil society organisations, and survivor networks.

## **B. Challenges and opportunities emerged since the 2RC**

128. International cooperation and assistance remain a cornerstone of implementation, enabling affected States Parties to access technical, financial and material support. Reporting from the 10MSP to 12MSP highlights both sustained engagement and persistent structural challenges.

129. While capacity to provide assistance varies, cooperation remains a core Convention obligation and a key means of translating commitments into practical support for affected States Parties.

130. States Parties continue to provide support across clearance, risk education, victim assistance and stockpile destruction, contributing to sustained implementation progress

131. However, disparities persist in access to assistance. Some States Parties successfully mobilise support, while others face constraints including limited project development capacity, weak data, shifting donor priorities and reduced attention to certain regions and sectors.

132. These gaps risk widening implementation disparities and underline the need for stronger prioritisation, improved needs articulation and more predictable and diversified funding.

133. Discussions have also highlighted concerns over declining and unpredictable funding for humanitarian disarmament activities, affecting clearance, victim assistance and risk education, with potential implications for implementation continuity.

134. Addressing these challenges may require further consideration of dedicated or pooled funding mechanisms, as well as multi-year funding approaches, including for victim assistance and risk education, for consideration at the 3RC.

135. Coordination of cooperation presents mixed results. While some national platforms function effectively, others face duplication and gaps, indicating uneven coordination across affected contexts.

136. There is growing emphasis on linking implementation with broader humanitarian, development and peacebuilding frameworks, including the SDGs and WPS Agenda, although practical integration remains uneven.

137. Predictability and multi-year funding remain key concerns. Despite relatively stable donor engagement, uncertainty continues to affect planning, sustainability and national ownership of implementation.

## IX. Transparency and Exchange of Information Measures

### A. Status of the situation, progress and evaluation of Actions 43 – 46 of the LAP

138. Article 7 transparency reporting remains a core obligation of the Convention and a key tool for accountability, confidence-building and monitoring implementation. States Parties continue to submit initial and annual reports, reflecting broad recognition of its importance for tracking progress and supporting peer learning.

139. Under **Action 43**, timely annual reporting within the 30 April deadline remains below universal compliance. From the 10MSP to 12MSP, timely submission reached 51 reports (46%), increasing to 63 (13MSP cycle). For 2026, 49 reports were submitted on time, with 52 received by 18 May 2026.

140. Despite gradual improvement, late submissions remain frequent, limiting the usefulness of data for timely analysis and decision-making. Overall reporting averaged 64% of the 112 required submissions during the period under review.

141. As of 30 April 2026, Five States Parties have not submitted initial reports: Cabo Verde (2011), Comoros (2011), Congo (2015), Guinea (2015), and Rwanda (2016), leaving persistent gaps in baseline transparency.

142. Under **Action 44**, reporting on Article 3 and 4 obligations remained relatively stable, with over 22 States Parties submitting reports annually, indicating continued but uneven engagement.

143. Under **Action 45**, the use of the adapted Article 7 reporting form (Action 45) increased from 24 (12MSP cycle) to 46 (13MSP cycle), improving clarity and comparability, although adoption remains uneven.

144. Requests for assistance on transparency reporting remain limited. No requests were made in the first two years post-2RC, and only three States Parties requested support during the 13MSP cycle. Informal assistance has, however, been provided through MSP support mechanisms.

## **B. Challenges and opportunities emerged since the 2RC**

145. Transparency reporting continues to strengthen confidence and cooperation, while supporting monitoring of implementation. However, inconsistencies in submission rates and quality limit its analytical value.

146. Most States Parties use Article 7 reporting to update on stockpile destruction, clearance, risk education, victim assistance, and cooperation, demonstrating its dual role as compliance and communication tool.

147. Persistent late reporting and missing initial reports result in incomplete implementation data, with some reports outdated or incomplete.

148. Significant variation persists in reporting quality and detail, reducing comparability and limiting analytical value across States Parties.

149. Capacity constraints, limited coordination, and insufficient institutional prioritisation continue to affect reporting performance in some States Parties.

150. Technical, linguistic, and institutional challenges remain key barriers to timely and comprehensive reporting, indicating need for sustained support.

151. Transparency reporting is increasingly recognised as a tool for coordination and resource mobilisation, but this potential remains underutilised.

## **X. National Implementation Measures**

### **A. Status of the situation, progress and evaluation of Actions 47 and 48 of the LAP**

152. Article 9 establishes the obligation for States Parties to adopt legal, administrative and other measures to implement the Convention nationally. Since the 2RC, this obligation has remained central to ensuring domestic enforcement of the Convention.

153. Actions 47 and 48 of the LAP focus on the adoption and revision of implementing legislation. While progress has been made, implementation remains uneven across States Parties.

154. Under Action 47, the number of States Parties reporting adequate national legislation increased from 63 (11MSP cycle) to 67 (13MSP). Of these, 32 reported that new legislation was still required, while 33 relied on pre-existing legislation adopted prior to entry into force.

155. Several States Parties report that draft legislation remains under consideration for extended periods, with limited reporting on timelines or interim progress, making it difficult to assess implementation status.

156. Reporting on dissemination of the Convention to national institutions increased modestly, but remains limited in relation to total membership, suggesting incomplete institutionalisation.

157. Overall progress reflects sustained political commitment, but translation into completed legal measures continues to face delays linked to legal complexity, competing priorities and capacity constraints.

158. Only a limited number of States Parties requested assistance on national implementation, with four requests recorded during the 12MSP cycle. This may indicate both limited awareness and underuse of available support mechanisms.

### **B. Challenges and opportunities emerged since the 2RC**

159. Reporting under Article 7 shows gradual progress but also persistent structural gaps in national implementation under Actions 47 and 48, highlighting uneven prioritisation of Article 9 obligations.

160. A positive trend is the increasing number of States Parties adopting or revising legislation prohibiting cluster munitions, reflecting strengthened legal commitment and reinforcement of the Convention's norms.

161. However, some States Parties continue to rely on general legal provisions or report long-standing legislative processes with limited progress, indicating delays between political commitment and legal implementation. National parliaments play a key role in advancing these processes.

162. Even where legislation exists, coverage of all Convention obligations varies, particularly regarding enforcement mechanisms and penal sanctions, limiting legal robustness.

163. National implementation measures differ significantly in scope and completeness, with some legislation addressing only core prohibitions while omitting broader obligations such as stockpile destruction or victim assistance.

164. Reporting quality also varies, with some States providing detailed legal information while others submit minimal updates, limiting comparability and assessment of compliance.

165. Requests for technical assistance remain limited but recurring, reflecting capacity constraints, legal complexity and competing national priorities that continue to slow legislative progress.

## **XI. Gender Mainstreaming**

### **A. Status of the situation and progress since the adoption of the LAP**

166. Gender considerations continue to be recognised by States Parties as a cross-cutting element of effective Convention implementation. Increased attention has been given to the differentiated impacts of cluster munitions, which affect civilians indiscriminately, while specific risks and needs may vary according to age and gender.

167. States Parties are encouraged to consider the needs, vulnerabilities and perspectives of women, girls, boys and men from diverse populations across all areas of implementation, including clearance, risk education, victim assistance and cooperation and assistance, in order to support inclusive implementation and participation.

168. Reporting indicates gradual progress in integrating gender considerations into national policies and activities, including through the use of sex- and age-disaggregated data and increased reference to participation of women in decision-making processes. However, participation of women in Convention-related processes remains uneven.

169. Gender considerations are often reflected in general terms and are not consistently translated into operational measures or integrated into broader implementation frameworks. Positive examples exist, including efforts by States Parties and partners to apply gender and diversity considerations in operational mine action activities.

170. Progress appears more advanced in victim assistance and risk education, where links to affected populations are more direct, while integration remains more limited in technical areas such as clearance and stockpile destruction. Differences in national context and institutional structures continue to influence implementation.

171. Overall, progress reflects a gradual shift from conceptual recognition towards initial operational integration. However, the absence of consistent methodologies, benchmarks and monitoring approaches continues to limit measurable progress. Strengthening data collection, including sex, age and disability disaggregation, remains important to support evidence-based implementation.

172. Limited availability of sex- and age-disaggregated data remains a key constraint, affecting the ability to design targeted responses and assess differentiated impacts. Where relevant, disability disaggregation can further support inclusive approaches.

173. Capacity constraints, including limited technical expertise and institutional guidance, continue to affect the systematic integration of gender considerations across implementation activities, leading to uneven application.

174. Some States Parties report good practices, including integration of gender considerations into operational guidelines, training materials, and the participation of women in survey, clearance and risk education activities.

175. The 2RC mandated Coordinators on General Status and Operation to serve as focal points on gender considerations. This provides an opportunity to strengthen coherence and continuity, subject to structured workplans and effective translation of guidance into practice.

## **B. Evaluation against the actions and objectives set forth in the LAP**

### **Action 4**

176. Reporting shows increased reference to gender considerations in national plans and activities, reflecting broader recognition of their relevance across implementation. However, integration remains uneven and is not consistently outcome-oriented.

177. Gender balance in leadership has improved gradually, with five States Parties having women presiding over meetings by the 13MSP, and increased representation of women in the Coordination Committee.

178. The number of delegations led by women increased to 25 during the 13MSP cycle, alongside higher participation of women in Convention meetings

179. These developments reflect progress in participation and visibility. However, increased participation does not necessarily translate into decision-making influence or systematic integration across all implementation areas

180. Variations in reporting practices continue to limit comparability and analytical value. A clearer understanding of “meaningful participation” would support more consistent monitoring of progress.

## **C. Challenges and opportunities emerged since the 2RC**

181. While a normative framework for inclusive implementation exists, practical application remains uneven, and benefits are not yet fully consistent across affected populations.

182. Limited availability of sex- and age-disaggregated data remains a key constraint, affecting the ability to design targeted responses and assess differentiated impacts. Where relevant, disability disaggregation can further support inclusive approaches.

183. Capacity constraints, including limited technical expertise and institutional guidance, continue to affect the systematic integration of gender considerations across implementation activities, leading to uneven application.

184. Opportunities exist to strengthen implementation by integrating gender considerations into national strategies, standard operating procedures and operational planning, including clearance, risk education, victim assistance and monitoring activities.

185. International cooperation and assistance can support implementation through targeted technical support, training and exchange of experience among States Parties and partners.

186. Inclusive stakeholder engagement, including persons with disabilities and affected communities, remains important. Practical measures such as accessibility of information and participation support are relevant to ensure inclusive engagement of all groups

187. Overall, progress continues toward broader integration of gender considerations across Convention pillars. Further emphasis on measurable outcomes would strengthen implementation and support more consistent application across contexts.

## **XII. Implementation Support**

188. The implementation of the CCM is supported by a machinery that includes the ISU, the MSP, intersessional meetings, the Coordination Committee, the Sponsorship Programme and the participation of other actors.

### **A. Implementation Support Unit**

#### **1. Status of the situation**

189. Following the 2MSP ISU Directive<sup>8</sup>, the ISU was established by the 4MSP<sup>9</sup> and become operational ahead of the 1RC, which adopted its first work plan, budget and financial procedures<sup>10</sup>. The funding model is based on annual contributions under categories 7(a) (contribution by States taking part in the MSP) and 7(b) (contribution by States Parties to the operation of the ISU), with voluntary excess contribution under 7(c), as communicated by the ISU and in accordance with the decisions of MSPs and RCs<sup>11</sup>.

190. During the 1RC, fifteen (15) States Parties<sup>12</sup> expressed reservations about the funding model, maintaining that Convention-explicit contributions should be binding. Subsequent revisions at the 7MSP adjusted procedures to improve predictability, compliance and collection rates<sup>13</sup>. The 2RC further adjusted the financing arrangements by introducing retrospective invoicing under category 7(a) for participation of non-States Parties in MSPs and Review Conferences, and by establishing an equal 50/50 allocation between categories 7(a) and 7(b).

191. Following adjustments, the ISU's financial situation continues to reflect structural imbalances. Annual budgets have relied heavily on voluntary excess contributions under category 7(c) from a limited number of States Parties, raising concerns about predictability and shared ownership. As of early 2026, contributions remained insufficient to fully meet the agreed 50/50 split under the CHF 497,138 budget approved by the 12MSP, with a remaining shortfall of CHF 5,668 after accounting for category 7(c) contributions.

192. Over the past five years, contributions received following the ISU's annual communication have been as follows:

<sup>8</sup> CCM/MSP/2011/WP.9, ISU Directive as adopted by 2MSP, CCM/MSP/2011/5, paragraph 29 (c)

<sup>9</sup> CCM/MSP/2013/6, paragraph 29

<sup>10</sup> CCM/CONF/2015/7, Annex V, Financial procedures for the ISU

<sup>11</sup> CCM/MSP/2017/12 and CCM/CONF/2021/6.

<sup>12</sup> CCM/CONF/2015/7, Annex VI, Declarations and/or reservations and/or positions of Bulgaria, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Mexico on behalf of also Austria, Ireland and New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Zambia

<sup>13</sup> CCM/MSP/2017/12, Annex 1, Specific Measures completing or amending the financial procedures adopted at the First Review Conference (CCM/CONF/2015/7, Annex V)

<i>Year</i>	<i>ISU Budget</i>	<i>Received</i>	<i>Category 7a</i>	<i>Category 7b</i>	<i>Category 7c</i>	<i>No. of contributing States</i>
2021			CHF 135,986 57,9 % covered	CHF 111,966 47,6 % covered	CHF 202,767	
	469,686	450,719	49 States	48 States	11 States	52 or 46 %
2022			CHF 149,930 61,7 % covered	CHF 102,122 42,0 % covered	CHF 213,413	
	486,194	465,465	58 States	57 States	11 States	61 or 55 %
2023			CHF 163,331 63,1 % covered	CHF 137,912 53,2 % covered	CHF 297,010	
	518,057 <sup>i</sup>	598,253	56 States	55 States	13 States	59 or 53 %
2024			CHF 190,375 79,7 % covered	CHF 166,568 69,7 % covered	CHF 106,249	
	477,774	463,192	69 States	68 States	9 States	70 or 63 %
2025			CHF 157.394 63,3 % covered	CHF 133,210 53,6 % covered	CHF 200,866	
	497,138	491,470 <sup>ii</sup>	66 States	65 States	8 States	68 or 61 %

<sup>i</sup> Budget approved by 2RC was CHF495,057 (CCM/CONF/2020/2/Rev.1). During 10MSP, a new budget was presented and approved, (CCM/MSP/2022/2) incl. a CHF23,000 cost item for hiring an external recruitment agency to oversee the recruitment process of the next Director.

<sup>ii</sup> Figures as of 07.01.2026, and not final. Percentage covered of budget categories 7a and 7b are therefore preliminary.

193. MSPs have repeatedly encouraged States Parties that have not yet provided financial contributions to do so, stressing the importance of timely payment to ensure the effective functioning of the ISU. This reflects an ongoing challenge in securing full contributions required under the approved budget.

194. More than half of the CCM membership has contributed to the ISU budget in four out of the five years under review, with 70 States contributing in 2024, the highest number in a decade. As in previous cycle, contributions under categories 7(a) have consistently exceeded those under 7(b), reflecting differing interpretation of their legal nature. The budget has nonetheless been met largely through significant voluntary contributions under category 7(c) from a limited number of States Parties. While these approaches are consistent with international law, their implications for predictability and shared responsibility remain unresolved.<sup>14</sup>

195. The ISU operates under a Host Agreement with the GICHD signed in 2014<sup>15</sup>, which provides administrative and logistical support. Since the 2RC, the GICHD has continued to provide substantial in-kind assistance estimated at approximately USD700,000,<sup>16</sup> Including office infrastructure, IT systems, communications, document management, human resource, finance, travel services, and support to the CCM meeting organisations and the Sponsorship Programme. This remains essential for the ISU's operational continuity.

196. The Working Capital Reserve remains stable at CHF 574,240, above the recommended level of CHF 400,000, providing a buffer for operational continuity.

197. During the review period, efforts strengthened institutional arrangements supporting the ISU within its hosting framework, including consultations on support modalities and administrative clarifications to ensure transparent and effective functioning with appropriate autonomy. In line with GICHD procedures, these arrangements also enabled the development of key management tools, including an ISU performance evaluation system.

<sup>14</sup> CCM/MSP/2025/17, paragraph 33

<sup>15</sup> CCM/MSP/2014/INF/1

<sup>16</sup> 1,00 CFH = 1.27 USD, 23 December 2025

198. The triannual review of the Host Agreement was completed at the 13MSP, reaffirming the existing arrangement and ensuring continuity of institutional support., consistent with decisions taken at 4MSP and earlier reviews in 2017 and 2020<sup>17</sup>.

199. Following discussions on possible synergies with other implementation support units, no formalisation has taken place due to legal, political, and structural differences between instruments. However, informal coordination with other regimes has continued where relevant, including efforts to align meeting schedules in Geneva to reduce costs and facilitate participation.

## **2. Challenges and opportunities highlighted since the 2RC**

200. The contribution-based model continues to affect predictability of funding, requiring continued attention to timely and stable contributions.

201. Implementation support needs have become more diversified, requiring tailored assistance across reporting, national implementation, coordination and participation in Convention processes.

202. Strengthening institutional continuity and knowledge management remains important to support long-term effectiveness of the implementation framework.

## **B. Meetings of the States Parties**

### **1. Status of the situation**

203. Article 11 provides for regular Meetings of States Parties (MSPs) to review implementation and take decisions. MSPs have been held annually since the IRC.

204. The duration of MSPs has varied between three and four days depending on financial contributions, reflecting the link between budgetary capacity and meeting arrangements.

205. MSPs continue to serve as the main forum for reviewing implementation across all thematic areas, including universalization, stockpile destruction, clearance, risk education, victim assistance, international cooperation, transparency and national implementation.

206. The LAP has strengthened coherence in implementation monitoring through guiding principles and indicators supporting structured review of progress.

207. States Parties have emphasised the importance of predictable financing, timely payment of contributions and sustained participation to ensure effective functioning of the Convention's machinery

208. MSPs also support exchange of experiences and identification of priority challenges between States Parties across implementation areas.

### **2. Challenges and opportunities highlighted since the 2RC**

209. Delays in payment of assessed contributions continue to affect planning and, at times, the duration and organisation of meetings.

210. The organisation of the 3RC outside of Geneva highlighted the need for clearer alignment on financial procedures, cost-estimates and timing. Following consultation among relevant stakeholders, the revised cost estimate was approved, enabling the preparations for the 3RC to proceed.

211. Leadership of MSPs has demonstrated strong regional rotation, reflecting shared ownership of the Convention.

212. However, the process for identifying future Presidencies remains informal, which may create uncertainty in transition planning and continuity<sup>18</sup>. The 14MSP Presidency (Austria) was confirmed only in April 2026, shortly before the 3RC.

<sup>17</sup> CCM/MSP/2025/18

<sup>18</sup> CCM/MSP/2018/WP.3, Establishment of a Process for the Selection of the Presidency of the CCM

## **C. Intersessional Meetings**

### **1. Status of the situation**

213. Intersessional meetings were reintroduced following the 2RC and have been held twice during the review period, in 2022 and 2025, funded through voluntary contributions and supported by the GICHD.

214. These meetings have enabled informal exchanges on implementation challenges, including Article 3 and 4 extension requests, and supported analytical work of ad hoc groups.

215. The 2025 meeting also provided a platform for discussion on emerging normative and implementation-related challenges within the Convention and broader humanitarian disarmament framework.<sup>19</sup>

### **2. Challenges and opportunities highlighted since the 2RC**

216. Intersessional exchanges are widely considered valuable for sharing experiences and strengthening cooperation. The practice aligns with other disarmament instruments. However, the need for greater streamlining of the disarmament calendar has also been raised.

217. Challenges are primarily logistical, including scheduling constraints in an increasingly crowded calendar. Limited predictability regarding whether meetings will be held each year can also complicate planning and resource mobilisation, including for sponsorship.

## **D. Coordination Committee**

### **1. Status of the situation**

218. The Coordination Committee was established by the 2MSP and comprises thematic coordinators covering all key areas of implementation, supported by the ISU and with the participation of CMC, ICRC and UNODA as observers.

219. It provides coordination across thematic areas and supports the Presidency in implementation follow-up and preparation of intersessional work

220. A dedicated coordination role on risk education was added during the review period, strengthening thematic focus

221. Coordinators are appointed by MSPs or Review Conferences for fixed terms and contribute to intersessional work planning.

222. The Committee meets regularly to support coordination, exchange of information and follow-up on LAP commitments

223. Ad hoc analysis groups on Articles 3 and 4 extension requests continue to support technical review processes with coordinated input from coordinators and the ISU.

### **2. Challenges and opportunities highlighted since the 2RC**

224. While participation in coordination roles has broadened across 43 States Parties, representation remains uneven across regions and membership.

225. More structured guidance on roles and responsibilities could further strengthen consistency and effectiveness of coordination work.

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<sup>19</sup> CCM/MSP/2025/15

## **E. Sponsorship programme**

### **1. Status of the situation**

226. The Sponsorship Programme remains an important mechanism to support participation of low-income and affected States Parties, contributing to inclusive implementation of the Convention.

227. Since the 2RC, 83 delegates from 38 countries have been supported to attend MSPs and intersessional meetings.

228. The Programme has gradually moved beyond a first-come, first-served approach towards more structured allocation principles. The 13MSP Presidency requested guidance to support more transparent allocation, and the 3RC Presidency has initiated informal consultations to further develop a more structured approach.

229. The Programme continues to support continuity of participation in reporting, dialogue and implementation processes.

### **2. Challenges and opportunities highlighted since the 2RC**

230. Funding remains dependent on a small number of donors, affecting predictability and sustainability. The absence of formal oversight mechanisms continues to limit strategic direction and consistency in application.

231. The Programme has long been an important enabler of inclusive participation in the Convention, particularly for low-income and affected States Parties. As it evolves, greater transparency, predictability, and shared ownership could be supported through clearer parameters and structured consultation mechanisms, while preserving the flexibility needed for timely decision-making.

## **F. Participation of other actors**

### **1. Status of the situation**

232. Implementation continues to benefit from engagement by a wide range of actors, including UN agencies, international organisations, civil society, technical institutions and research bodies.

233. Anchored in the preambular text and Article 11.3 of the Convention, and its Rules of Procedure<sup>20</sup>, the involvement of partners has remained an important feature of the Convention's implementation approach. This partnership has supported broad participation and strengthened collective efforts towards the full and effective implementation of the Convention.

234. UNODA, UNMAS, UNDP, UNICEF and other UN agencies remain key contributors to implementation, alongside other UN system actors engaged in mine action.

235. The ICRC, CMC, Mine Action Review and GICHD continue to play important roles in legal, advocacy, research and technical support.

236. Additional contributions come from NGOs and thematic groups working on gender, diversity, environment and humanitarian disarmament issues.

237. Youth engagement has expanded through initiatives such as the Youth for Humanitarian Disarmament Multimedia Contest, which has increased participation and visibility of youth perspectives.

238. Engagement with parliamentarians, including through the IPU, has strengthened outreach and support for implementation.

<sup>20</sup> CCM/MSP/2010/3, chapter 1, Rule 1.2-3, CCM Rules of Procedure as adopted by the 1MSP (CCM/MSP/2010/5)

**2. Challenges and opportunities highlighted since the 2RC**

239. The broadening of actors supporting implementation has strengthened delivery across thematic areas and reinforced humanitarian objectives. At the same time, the increasing diversity of actors highlights the importance of maintaining coherence, coordination and alignment with States Parties' priorities to ensure measurable implementation outcomes.

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