



CONVENTION
ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Article 4 CCM Extension Request



The Federal Republic of Somalia



A. Executive Summary

1. **Duration of the proposed extension:**

- a. The proposed extension period is four years: from 1 March 2026 to 1 March 2030. Somalia has recently launched a National Transformation Plan (NTP 2025-2029) which requires activities of all government entities to be aligned to it, aiming to address systemic and structural challenges including weak institutional frameworks, limited resources and inadequate capacities, and persistent threats to national security from violent extremist groups that are obstructing movements. The plan is anticipated to bring an improved security environment, marked by reduced terrorism and conflict, which will enable Somalia to achieve both social and economic progress. The plan also includes financial sustainability, achieved through reduced donor dependency and efficient resource mobilisation by the government organs. Thus, the extension request is aligned to benefit from the wider National Transformation Plan.
- b. This is the first extension request.

2. **Rational and resource mobilization:**

- a. The implementation of the existing treaty was limited due to access restriction as the areas are still controlled by the anti-government armed groups.
- b. Somalia is committed to coordinate with the available mine action operators to respond the known CMRs. The national mine action body is expecting the inclusion into the government budget that could contribute to the implementation of this convention.
- c. While SEMA waiting for the approval of the parliamentary bill, Somalia depends on mine action partners that are operating in the country, and in turn the support of donor countries.

3. **Preparation of future work and the status of work already conducted under national clearance and demining programmes during the initial 10-year period and any subsequent extensions:**

- a. Considering the size of the known hazard areas, comprehensive plan is not necessary – nine known CMR reports have so far been recorded in the national database.
- b. No significant progress has been made as the areas of the CMR are not accessible due to security issues.

4. **Total area containing cluster munition remnants at the time of entry into force of the Convention for that State Party and any additional areas containing cluster munition remnants discovered after such entry into force:**

- a. At the time of entry into force of the Convention, the total area containing cluster munition remnants in areas under the jurisdiction or control of the State Party was Area size unknown- 8 hazard areas identified.
- b. Since entry into force of the Convention, Somalia has discovered additional areas containing cluster munition remnants of Area size unknown- 6 hazard areas identified.



5. **Total area containing cluster munition remnants cleared since entry into force of the Convention (land release methodologies applied):**
 - a. Since entry into force of the Convention, Two hazard areas were *cleared in Diinsor and Dusamareeb, and one hazard area was cancelled in Bangeela.*

6. **Total area containing cluster munition remnants remaining to be cleared during the proposed extension:**
 - a. The total area containing cluster munition remnants remaining to be cleared during the proposed extension is *Area size unknown- 11 hazard areas have been identified as spot hazards.*

7. **Circumstances that have impeded the ability of the State Party to destroy all cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control during the initial 10-year period, and those that may impede its ability during the proposed extension:**
 - a. The main challenges Somalia faced regarding the clearance of the CMRs was access to the hazard areas known to have been contaminated. The districts where CMR were recorded in Southwest and Jubaland are completely controlled by the armed groups (al-Shabab).
 - b. Due to the inaccessibility, Somalia still faces challenges to further investigate the details of the CMR reports which resulted in lack of comprehensive and updated data on contamination levels.
 - c. Besides to the security challenges, Somalia has been one of the countries that has experienced consistent funding distress that resulted a decrease of partners footprint. Currently, only one humanitarian mine action partner (The HALO Trust) remained in country with the capability to collaborate has security improves.
 - d. The Pro-Government Security Forces are exerting continuous efforts to liberate and recover the areas controlled by the armed groups; however, the timeline could not be ascertained at the time of the extension request.

8. **The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the proposed extension:**
 - a. *The extension will contribute to the overall explosive threat mitigation efforts to restore access to land and enable the resumption of livelihoods, and safe humanitarian access. Among these activities, clearance of every explosive ordnance (EO), including CMR, is vital in Somalia. The ongoing conflict is causing persistent EO contaminations that result in safety concerns, insecurity, loss of livelihoods, and limited movements. To mitigate these issues, Somalia needs to continue providing proportional mine action services to support Somali population which has been a victim of displacements to unsafe areas. Thus, survey and clearance of the CMR is equally necessary to contributed to the safety and livelihood changes at both community and household levels.*

9. **Provide full contact details of the national focal person with whom follow-up will be conducted:**
 - a. Name: Mr. Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle
 - b. Title: Director General
 - c. Email: dahiru@sema.org.so
 - d. Phone Number: +252 61 7202082

B. Detailed Narrative

Somalia signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) on 3 December 2008, ratified it on 30 September 2015, and the Convention entered into force for it on 1 March 2016.

1. **Total area to be addressed** at entry into force, as defined in Article 2, paragraph 11, and Article 4, paragraph 6.e was 8 locations. *However, the exact size of the contaminated area remains unknown due to limited access and the lack of comprehensive survey data.*

State and Location	Area (m2)	Submunition type	Estimated quantity	Estimated or known date of Contamination
1. South West, Bakool, Rabdhuuro	100	RBK 250-275 Container	1	1/9/2015
2. South West, Bakool, Rabdhuuro	100	RBK 250-275 Container	1	1/9/2015
3. South West, Bakool, Rabdhuuro	100	RBK 250-275 Container	1	30/08/2015
4. South West, Bakool, Rabdhuuro	100	RBK 250-275 Container	1	3/9/2015
5. South West, Bakool, Rabdhuuro	100	RBK 250-275 Container	1	2015
6. South West, Bakool, Rabdhuuro	100	RBK 250-275 Container	1	2015
7. Banadir Region, Daynile Bangeela	100	Cluster Dispenser	1	5/12/2020
8. Jubaland, Middle Juba-Buale	N/A	BL-755 Submunitions	1	5/1/2016

2. **Total area discovered** since the entry into force in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 6.d was 6 *suspected contaminated areas*-The exact extent of contamination in these areas has not yet been determined due to insufficient survey data and limited access to some locations due to security concerns, and insufficient technical and financial resources to conduct detailed assessments.

State and Location	Area (m2)	Submunition type	Estimated quantity	Estimated or known date of Contamination
1. Jubaland, Gedo-Garbahaarey, Shabeel	100	RBK 250 Container	1	2/8/2017
2. Galmudug, Galgadud Dusamreeb, Mareer guur	100	AO-15CH Container-Submunition	1	18/07/2017
3. Jubaland, Gedo-Dolow	N/A	AO-15CH Container-Submunition	1	2016
4. Jubaland, Gedo Bardere	N/A	Modified BL-755 Submunitions	1	Unknown
5. South West, Bay, Diinsor	100	PTAB-2.5M	1	September 2016
6. Galmudug, Galgadud Dusamreeb, Mareer guur	150	PTAB-2.5M	2	25/07/2017

3. **Total new contamination including date of contamination** since entry into force in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 1.b

N/A

4. **Area addressed since entry into force disaggregated by cancellation through NTS, reduction through TS or cleared.**

Methods of land release	Year	Area	Size M2
Non-technical survey	2020	Bangeela	100m ²

Technical survey		Nil	
Clearance	2016	Diinsor	100m ²
Clearance	2017	Dusamareeb,	150m ²
Total			350m²

5. Quantity and type of cluster munitions destroyed.

Type	Quantity	Location	Destruction method (if information is available)	Year
PTAB-2.5M	2	Dusamareb, Galmudug	Cleared	2022
PTAB 2.5M	1	Diinsor, South West	Cleared	2018
Total	3			

6. Estimated area remaining to be addressed (specify SHA, CHA) in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 6.f

Location	Suspected Hazardous Area	Confirmed Hazardous Area	Comments
1. South West, Bakool, Rabdhuuro	1	0	Under AS
2. South West, Bakool, Rabdhuuro	1	0	Under AS
3. South West, Bakool, Rabdhuuro	1	0	Under AS
4. South West, Bakool, Rabdhuuro	1	0	Under AS
5. South West, Bakool, Rabdhuuro	1	0	Under AS
6. South West, Bakool, Rabdhuuro	1	0	Under AS
7. Jubaland, Gedo- Garbahaarey, Shabeel	1	0	Survey
8. Galmudug, Galgadud Dusamreeb, Mareer guur	1	0	Survey
9. Jubaland, Gedo-Dolow	1	0	Survey
10. Jubaland, Gedo Bardere	1	0	Survey
11. Jubaland, Middle Juba- Buale	1	0	Under AS

7. Amount of time requested, in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 6.a: Four years (1 March 2026 to 1 March 2030)

8. Circumstances which impeded the ability of the requesting State Party to fulfil its obligations, in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 6.g:

a. Limited Access to Contaminated Areas:

- The identified areas with indications of CMR contamination remain under the control of anti-government armed groups, severely restricting access for mine action operators.
- Ongoing conflict in multiple regions further exacerbates the challenge of reaching and addressing these contaminated areas.

b. Security Challenges: Continued hostilities and instability in several regions hinder safe and sustained clearance operations.

c. Institutional and Financial Constraints:


- The Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) faces significant operational challenges due to a lack of consistent and adequate institutional funding.

- Limited financial resources reduce SEMA's capacity to effectively plan and execute mine action activities in compliance with its obligations under the Convention.

These combined challenges significantly hinder progress in fulfilling Somalia's obligations under the CCM.

9. National laws and standards in place? Info on national demining structure.

- a) **National laws:** The Mine Action bill for SEMA has been waited for a long time following the submission to the office of the Prime Minister office on 1 June 2024, along 14 others to the Federal Parliament for approval. The Ministry of Internal Security of the Federal Government of Somalia was committed to tabling the Bill to the Parliament anticipating progress over the coming Quarter of this year. The Bill is expected to allow SEMA to receive national funding to sustainably support the oversight of the humanitarian mine action sector in Somalia.
- b) **National Mine Action Standards (NMAS);** Somalia's National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) are designed in alignment with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). The initial edition of the NMAS was published on August 1, 2018. However, finalization has been delayed due to several factors, including a lack of funding for stakeholder consultations, political instability, and the absence of international technical experts to assist in the review process. With the support of international organizations and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Somalia has successfully revised the Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) and Non-Technical Survey (NTS) standards in late 2024, and currently working on revising the Information Management (IM) standard. Subsequent to the completion of the IM review, NMAS for the Battle Area Clearance (BAC) will be addressed as the next priority.
- c) **National Demining Structure:**



10. Methodologies utilized are in compliance with international standards including IMAS in accordance with Article 4.3(NTS, TS, clearance)

Somalia has documented nine areas with indications of CMR contamination based on non-technical surveys (NTS) conducted before these areas were recaptured by armed groups. These initial surveys provided valuable early assessments of contamination, but the loss of access to the areas due to security restrictions has prevented further detailed investigations and clearance efforts. As a result, the full scope of contamination in these areas remains undetermined, hindering timely intervention and risk reduction for affected communities.

In accordance with international standards, Somalia will continue to apply a comprehensive approach utilizing non-technical surveys (NTS), technical surveys (TS), and clearance operations, in addition to risk education programs. These methodologies are aligned with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) to ensure the effective identification, assessment, and remediation of contaminated areas, while prioritizing the safety of local communities and supporting the country's obligations under the Convention.

11. Annual projections of CMR contaminated areas to be addressed and by what method (NTS, TS, clearance), in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 6.b

Considering the current capacity of mine action teams operating in Somalia—including survey teams, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, deminers, and risk education teams—there is used to be sufficient expertise to respond to the identified hazards. However, due to security challenges and restricted access to contaminated areas, the time frame for accessing these areas cannot be accurately determined. Consequently, while the necessary resources and methodologies, such as non-technical surveys (NTS), technical surveys (TS), and clearance operations, are in place, the ability to implement these activities in a timely manner remains contingent on the evolving security situation and access to the affected regions.

As Somalia is still in active conflict situation, it is still very complicated to carry out further survey in areas with limited or no access. The Somali government's campaign against Al-Shabaab and ISIL is still ongoing, and while some regions have been liberated, the Federal Government has developed a stabilization plan to provide humanitarian support to communities living in these newly liberated areas. There were not any CMR identified during the survey carried out 2024 across the recently recovered area. This plan includes survey of the liberated areas and provision of risk education awareness initiatives mainly for the affected population. In December 2024, Somalia revised its national risk education standards to align with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 12.10 on Risk Education. These revised standards are designed to enhance the effectiveness of risk education initiatives across the country. With the intention to cover the areas that are not accessible, mine action partners used to deliver risk education through radio broadcast and audio messages of talking devices that include safety messages to counter the risks posed by all explosive ordnance including CMR. Over the past decade, close to two-million direct beneficiaries were reached out with risk education messages in accessible districts of the country.

12. Methods to be used to render CMR contaminated areas no longer dangerous, in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 6.b

Somalia has a dedicated mine action coordination authority (SEMA), which oversees humanitarian mine action efforts across the country. SEMA is actively monitoring and assessing the feasibility of accessing areas contaminated with CMRs. These areas are already incorporated into the operational plans for NTS by mine action operators.

Each NTS team (UN-contracted and INGO), is composed of various specialists, including a liaison officer or risk education facilitator, demining operators, a medic, and other support

staff. These teams are equipped to carry out comprehensive activities such as risk education, NTS, marking of contaminated areas, and spot battle area clearance. This approach ensures that affected areas are thoroughly assessed and rendered safe through a combination of risk mitigation measures, survey methods, and clearance operations, in accordance with international standards.

13. Financial, technical, material, personnel needs per year

Financial requirements: Considering the insignificance of the CMRs identified the task to respond to the hazard can be incorporated with the capacity currently operating in country – no need to allocate a standalone budget for CMR.

The People's Republic of China has generously supported the Government with funding to carry out Non-Technical Survey (NTS) activities, Capacity Development and Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) outreach efforts conducted in Somalia by the Somalia Explosive Management Authority. The focus was on the field assessments and historical data analysis, alongside the successful outreach to 4,005 beneficiaries in Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) communities in Dayniile and Kaxda districts of Banadir region. The Republic of China funding is one of the potential donors that the Government has identified to approach once again for continue funding.

Technical needs: Considering the reported amount and nature of indications of the contamination, a survey/EOD team equipped with basic demining/EOD equipment will suffice to address the problem of the reported CMR. However, further capacity and timeframe will be identified once the detail of the actual contaminations are defined.

Material requirements: Basic demining/EOD equipment will suffice to address the problem of the reported CMR.

Personnel needs: There are few CMR identified so far, and not much fresh contamination is expected thus, an EOD capacity of seven personnel will be enough to address the contaminations. Survey/EOD trained qualification will be enough to do the work.

14. National financial resources required, in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 6.b.

The national mine action authority (SEMA) is expecting the inclusion of its personnel into the Government budget once the Parliamentary Bill is passed. Otherwise, SEMA fully depends on the international partners for financial support.

Financial planning: The national mine action authority (SEMA) will continue to seek assistance from the international partners operating in the country. In parallel, SEMA has commenced approaching potential donors for a direct funding. So far, SEMA has been successful to get some funding from UNDP and the Government of China. The funding however will be used for the coordination of the humanitarian mine action sector contributing to the implementation of the conventions signed by Somalia.

Sustainability measures: The national mine action authority (SEMA) is expecting the parliamentary Bill to be passed and get included into the government payroll to sustainably cover the costs of the coordination of the implementation of the conventions.

Financial accountability: SEMA has experienced personnel to manage the finance of GSAs and PCAs with a regular reporting procedure. SEMA is also open to comply any audit requirements of donors embracing accountability in case of discrepancies. All transactions are made its official bank Account which the line ministry also has an oversight authority.

15. Assistance needs incl. financial resources required, in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 6.b

There no national budget allocated for mine action sector so far.

Needs	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Amount
Human resources	xx				
Operation	xx				
Support and admin costs	xx				
Overhead costs	xx				
Total international assistance required	xx				

16. Resource mobilization plan

Due to the current economic situation in Somalia, SEMA is still reliant on foreign financial resources. However, a budget proposal for SEMA has been submitted to the Ministry of Internal Security (MOIS). It is hoped that approval of SEMA bill together with allocations from the State budget will improve to facilitate future contributions of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), as well as leverage international support to SEMA. In the meantime, SEMA is currently working with stakeholders on a national capacity building to coordinate the ongoing non-technical survey and risk education across the liberated areas. While waiting for the Parliamentary Bill, SEMA will continue resource mobilisation including from non-traditional (new) donors.

a. Coordination and Communication:

SEMA will closely work with stakeholders to continue its coordination role in support of the mine action operators in country that are exerting lifesaving efforts in accessible areas. It is envisaged that consultations with mine action partners, potential donors, authorities, and communities will continue through the implementation of this convention.

b. Communication strategy

SEMA will deliver a consistent message to all intended donors, both traditional and non-traditional, through all communication channels, including at international advocacy forums highlighting the current situation of Somalia and the criticality of the financial needs considering the decreasing presence of the international partners that have been key in assisting the mine action sector. NGOs supports at this transition juncture. To reinforce that coherence in the message and highlight how mine action inscribes itself in a wider development perspective, the framework of the development goals will be used. The communication will therefore point out how the mine action contributes to achieve the broader sustainable development goals (SDGs) and Somalia Transformation Plan (NTP). Persistent communication between the donors, implementing partners and government stakeholders will focus on sharing information about the progress of the implementation of the convention, challenges and lessons learned through various communication platforms.

c. Monitoring and Evaluation:

SEMA will map all potential donors and approach donors for financial assistance to cover the costs to implement the conventions while anticipating the transition to a more sustainable government budget. SEMA will make sure greater transparency, efficiency, and fairness to the procurement of the implementing partners using the donors funding. The evaluation procedure involves a cumulative analysis whereby the total score is obtained by evaluating a combination of technical and financial attributes. The proposal with the highest cumulative

score is recommended for the contract or grant award. Transparent and efficient usage of funding is expected to encourage donors' interest in supporting the mine action sector.

17. Humanitarian, social, economic and environmental implications of the extension, in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 6.h

a. Humanitarian implications: *Assess impact on civilian safety and victim assistance programs.*

Years of armed conflict in Somalia has resulted in a significant contamination with explosive ordnance (EO), including landmines, Unexploded Ordnance and to some extent Cluster Munitions. Considering this, mine action is crucial to provide emergency assistance for the conflict-affected populations to live their daily lives safely and for humanitarian agencies to deliver protection assistance safely. All mine action operations are closely coordinated with the protection clusters ensuring that mine action, as a key protection imperative, integrated in the overall humanitarian response plan.

b. Social implications: *Examine effects on community structures and access to essential services.*

Explosive hazards continue to endanger the lives of civilians to safely access their environments, causing intermittent accidents, and have a detrimental impact on safety of mobility of communities. The threat from these hazards is further compounded by an increasing number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) migrating through or settling in potentially contaminated areas while in search of relief due to the prolonged drought. These hazardous areas also hamper socio-economic activities, and directly impact the safety of the vulnerable communities, including returnees, IDPs and nomads, as they restrict access to land and other resources.

c. Economic implications: *Evaluate impact on local economies, livelihoods, and national budgets.*

Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) will work closely with mine action partners as well as with local communities (women, men and youth will be involved in setting priorities), and local authorities to identify personnel to be recruited locally promoting financial benefits to the local markets. In addition to the safety, the communities will be benefitting from the markets generated.

d. Environmental implications: *Consider effects on ecosystems, soil quality, and biodiversity.*

The health and safety of SEMA and mine action implementing partners is of paramount importance. The National Mine Action Standards incorporates a chapter (ch-19) on Environmental, Health and Safety that requires IPs to consider mitigation procedures of the impacts of mine action operations on the environment.

e. Cross-cutting considerations: *Ensure gender responsiveness and adherence to human rights standards.*

The national mine action office follows gender responsive approach having a dedicated Gender Diversity and Inclusion officer making sure Gender and Diversity is considered by implementing partners, sex and age-disaggregated data be systematically captured and included in all reporting and operations. Gender equality will also be promoted during its implementation of this CCM, and significant efforts will be made to hire women in a variety of roles by the operators. During survey and EORE activities, voices raised by women, men, boys, and girls will be recorded disaggregated by age and sex to better understand the impact of CMRs. Furthermore, groups of people with disabilities and minority clans will also be included considering the rights of inclusion.

f. Monitoring and mitigation: *Establish mechanisms for ongoing impact monitoring and proactive mitigation strategies.*

The implementation of the CCM will include a clear and measurable indicators and targets which will be regularly monitored to assess the progress of the treaty compliance. The implementation plan will include further detail on the schedule of activities and the data collection tools, the frequency and responsibility. The operators will be required to submit regular reports on activities and outputs of CMR, together with other relevant risks, issues or lessons, over certain period of reporting. SEMA has Quality Management System which regularly inspects activities and assesses the outputs to ensure the adherence to the compliance monitoring reports of the CCM. The areas suspected with CMRs are still controlled by the armed groups compromising safety to access and conduct surveying or monitoring progress of response activities. Thus, Somalia still foresees and considers the importance to carry out detailed baseline survey to further investigate extent of CMR contaminations and monitor any possible responses. Despite the absence of significant progress in addressing the CMRs, Somalia will submit its annual Article 7 report for the past two calendar years 2023-2024 together.

g. Research Studies Conducted: *N/A*

18. Any other information relevant to the request, in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 6.i

Other scenarios/ and inaccessible areas: Years of armed conflict in Somalia has resulted in a significant contamination with explosive ordnance (EO), including landmines, Unexploded Ordnance and to some extent Cluster Munitions. This convention will aim to address the CMR contamination in Somalia, through the implementation of a non-technical survey (NTS)/EOD and the provision of explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) to contribute to the safety and security of the civilian communities. However, the areas evidenced with CMR are not accessible to the mine action operators due the dominance of the anti-government armed groups. Somalia is at a transition phase to transfer the security responsibility from the AUSSOM (ATMIS) troops to Somali Security Forces. Conflicts are intermittently occurring to recover more areas. Progress is made but the completion of the conflict cannot be ascertained. Recent reports indicated a persistent deterioration of the security situation associated with political frictions and funding distress to the mission in general.

Gender and diversity considerations: Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 included provisions on gender and diversity. However, a new strategy is being developed this year 2025, with a support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). SEMA has actively advocated for gender and diversity inclusion within survey and community liaison teams. However, challenges remain in achieving gender mainstreaming in Somalia, given its patriarchal society. Additionally, clan affiliation plays a significant role and must be carefully considered

National Mine Action Strategy Plan: SEMA as a national mine action authority is domiciled under the Ministry of Internal Security (MOIS) with a strategy plan that provides the overarching framework for how its internal security institutions, agencies and authorities will deliver their core objectives over the next four years – 2024 to 2029. This strategic plan takes its direction and guidance from a range of higher-level national policies and strategic plans including the National Development Plan (NDP) which is been substituted by the recently launched Somali National Transformation Plan (NTP 2025-2029). The Federal Government has published the NTS last month. The strategy identifies eight key strategic priorities for the next four years – from extending rule of law as part of Somali transition operations through to enhancing the oversight role and management processes of the Ministry and its institutions, where SEMA is responsible to plan, coordinate, implement and provide oversight of all mine

action programs and treaty compliance in order to reduce the explosive ordnance threats to the population. The strategy includes the following key roles of SEMA:

- FGS oversight of mine clearance and explosives management related activities in Somalia.
- Implement the obligations of the government of Somalia under the Mine Ban Convention and Cluster Munitions Convention as well as the other disarmament treaties signed and/or ratified by the Somali Government.
- Plan, implement and oversee all five components of Mine Action. Supervise the plans of the national mine action centres.
- Approve /endorse mine action strategies and plans at the national level. Coordinate and supervise all mine action programmes / projects in the country.
- Develop and follow up implementation of the mine action standards in accordance with international mine action standard (IMAS) with the aim to regulate mine action activities in the country.
- Identify responsibilities and activities in accordance with HMA priorities contained in the national HMA plans addressing the needs of risk education, survey and clearance of explosive ordnance including CMR hazards.
- Establish information management system for mine action IMSMA.

Residual contamination management: Somalia has already established EOD/IEDD trained Police teams across all Federal Member States that will be able to respond to community callouts. The teams also have the capability and a package on explosive hazard threat awareness which can be enhanced to incorporate CMR awareness in support of the local population.

Risk education: Somalia has extensive experience in delivering risk education to local populations in areas affected by contamination, particularly in regions that have been recovered. The country has developed a National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) for Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE), aligned with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). EORE for Cluster Munition Remnants (CMR) is fully integrated into the existing safety awareness programs, ensuring consistent messaging and outreach. In collaboration with its partners, Somalia has recently developed and disseminated safety messages focused on the evolving threat posed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which are significantly impacting the civilian population. These efforts are part of a comprehensive approach to raise awareness, mitigate the risks, and protect communities from the dangers of both CMRs and IEDs.

Victim Assistance (VA): Whereas there are no instances or victims recorded as having been impacted by CMR in Somalia, the overall VA needs are extensive, and are attributable to other explosive ordnance including IEDs, ERW and mines. In response, Somalia developed a VA policy in 2022, along with a national action plan that contributes to the CRPD, in collaboration with the National Disability Agency (NDA), which is the leading authority to address the plight of PwD in Somalia.

Donors: Several donors have been historically supporting the humanitarian mine action sector in Somalia including The Government of Japan, the Government of German, Finland, Ireland, The Government of the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Norway, European Union, recently The Government of China, UNICEF, and UNDP among others. The Government will approach to the Government of China for potential continuation of the recent funding. Any available funding secured by SEMA will consider the inclusion of activities to address the CMR contaminated hazards.

Implementation Agencies: Several implementing partners have been supporting the humanitarian mine action sector in Somalia, with the capability to respond to Cluster Munition Remnants (CMR). However, the number of international mine action partners has recently

faced serious funding challenges, which has slowed the overall implementation of plans. Currently, there is only one humanitarian mine action operator with the capability to respond to CMRs: The HALO Trust which has confirmed its technical capability to address CMRs and has reportedly responded to two PTAB-2.5M bomblets in Galmudug area. Ukroboroneservices has destroyed PTAB-2.5M, USSR origin bomblet in Dinsoor, South west area.

SEMA is actively advocating for international support through the MSP (Meeting of States Parties) and NDM (National Directors and UN Advisors meeting) to support the mine action program in Somalia. Some implementing partners have expressed interest in working in Somalia, provided funding is secured.

Information Management: The Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) utilizes the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) to coordinate and manage mine action activities across Somalia. SEMA, with the support of GICHD, is undergoing transition from IMSMA NG to the IMSMA Core which is fully functional, with only a few remaining tasks to finalize the migration of historical data, such as Non-Technical Surveys (NTS), Clearance, and Completion reports. Field operators conducting mine action activities collect data using standardized forms and protocols and then submit it into the new IMSMA database. Additionally, SEMA staff receive support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), to upgrade to IMSMA Core.

19. Annexes

a. Maps

Annex-a: Map

