ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining expresses its utmost gratitude to the people and institutions that have so generously collaborated to produce this guide by sharing data, experiences, resources and expert feedback.

These include representatives of the armed forces of Austria; the armed forces of Belgium; the armed forces of Switzerland; the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Mine Action Center; Ban Landmines Campaign Nepal; the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority; Cambodian Self Help Demining; Catholic Relief Services; the Civil Protection Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior of Croatia; the Croatian Red Cross; the Federal Control Centre for Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Lower Saxony State Office for Construction and Real Estate of Germany; GEODE–DEMINETEC; the HALO Trust; Humanity & Inclusion; the Lebanon Mine Action Centre; the Mines Advisory Group; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Zambia; the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Action of Mozambique; the National Regulatory Authority for the Unexploded Ordnance / Mine Action Sector in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic; Norwegian People’s Aid; PeaceTrees Vietnam; Project Renew; the Quang Tri Mine Action Center, Vietnam; the Thailand Mine Action Centre; the United Nations Children’s Fund; the United Nations Development Programme; and the UXO (unexploded ordnance) and Legacy Sites Program of the Department of National Defence of Canada. Without their willingness to share information and provide valuable insights transparently, the publication of this guide would not have been possible.

This publication was funded by grants from the United States Department of State and the German Federal Foreign Office. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State and the German Federal Foreign Office. The GICHD would also like to thank the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs of the State Department of the United States of America and the German Federal Foreign Office for the financial support provided for this project.

The guide has been written by Katrin Atkins (RISKey GmbH) and Céline Cheng (Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining).

Front page image: Katrin Atkins
CONTENTS

Abbreviations .................................................................................................................. 4

Terms and definitions ........................................................................................................ 4

Executive summary ........................................................................................................... 5

1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 7

2. Planning and implementation of explosive ordnance risk education in residual contamination management ........................................................................................................ 8

3. Monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning in relation to explosive ordnance risk education in residual contamination management ........................................ 19

4. Capacity and training in explosive ordnance risk education in residual contamination management ........................................................................................................ 22

5. Conclusion: Needs related to and preconditions for explosive ordnance risk education as part of residual contamination management in South-East Asia .................................................................................. 24
ABBREVIATIONS

- **EORE**: explosive ordnance risk education
- **GICHD**: Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
- **IMAS**: International Mine Action Standards
- **MEAL**: monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning
- **RCM**: residual contamination management
- **United Kingdom**: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- **UXO**: unexploded ordnance

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

- **All reasonable effort**: The term ‘describes what is considered a minimum acceptable level of effort to identify and document contaminated areas or to remove the presence or suspicion of explosive ordnance. All reasonable effort has been applied when the commitment of additional resources is considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results expected’. (Standard 04.10 of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS))

- **Explosive ordnance risk education (EORE)**: The term ‘refers to activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from [explosive ordnance] by raising awareness of women, girls, boys and men in accordance with their different vulnerabilities, roles and needs and promoting behavioural change. Core activities include public information dissemination, education and training’. (IMAS 04.10)

- **Land release**: ‘In the context of mine action, the term describes the process of applying “all reasonable effort” to identify, define and remove all presence and suspicion of explosive ordnance through non-technical survey, technical survey and/or clearance. The criteria for “all reasonable effort” shall be defined by the [national mine action authority]. (IMAS 04.10)

- **Residual risk**: In general risk management, residual risk is ‘the risk remaining after risk treatment’. (International Organization for Standardization standard ISO 27001:2013) In technical mine action, residual risk is ‘the risk remaining following the application of all reasonable effort to identify, define and remove all presence and suspicion of explosive ordnance through non-technical survey, technical survey and/or clearance’. (IMAS 04.10)

- **Residual contamination**: The term ‘refers to contamination which gives rise to residual risk’. (IMAS 04.10).
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EORE is one of the five pillars of mine action. Over the years, a wide range of approaches to EORE have been used in mine action programmes worldwide. Much less attention, however, has been given to how to approach EORE when a mine action programme transitions to residual contamination management (RCM). Many questions arise, including whether there is a requirement to inform and educate people about a risk that is only residual and, if there is, what an EORE component in RCM looks like.

This guide presents current EORE practices in four selected South-East Asian countries (Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Thailand and Vietnam), as well as in other countries that engage in RCM, and highlights key issues related to the conduct of EORE in RCM. The main findings and principle considerations are as follows:

Planning and implementation of explosive ordnance risk education in residual contamination management

The planning of EORE starts with comprehensive formative research, including the identification of groups at risk.

- In RCM, the identification of groups at risk should focus on analysis of data and indicator measurements related to the nature of the remaining explosive ordnance threat and to activities that are linked with the threat, such as farming. This may require the adaptation or further development of the indicators that are currently used in the selected South-East Asian countries.

- In RCM, a specific group or body should 1) be designated as responsible for data analysis and the identification of the groups at risk and 2) be given access to the relevant data, including details about items of explosive ordnance reported and explosive ordnance disposal tasks.

It is important to consider how to ensure the sustainability of EORE activities in RCM through the incorporation of EORE activities in existing government and societal structures.

- Initiatives to incorporate EORE in societal structures are already in place in the South-East Asian countries that participated in the study. Many of the initiatives may also be appropriate in the context of RCM. The important thing is to ensure that the initiatives are based on a formal mandate and receive sufficient funding.

- Oversight of EORE in RCM requires that EORE be incorporated in the government structure. Governments should acknowledge EORE in RCM as a specific mandate, allocate it to a suitable body and ensure that there is sufficient State funding for that body to carry out its mandate.

- The incorporation of EORE in any government or societal structure should be done in a manner that leaves sufficient flexibility to react to changing circumstances related to explosive ordnance threats and groups at risk.

The transition from a mine action programme to RCM should involve consideration of how to incorporate EORE in legal and normative frameworks.

- When planning the transition from a mine action programme to RCM, it is necessary to ascertain whether EORE is covered by the existing legal framework. If it is, there needs to be analysis of whether the existing legal framework will still be applicable to RCM. If not, a legal framework for EORE in RCM should be established.

- Existing legal frameworks may be used to transfer some of the responsibilities in RCM to specific sectors. For example, regulations concerning health and safety in the construction sector can be used as the basis for an obligation to conduct EORE for construction workers.

- The normative frameworks in the selected South-East Asian countries have been established using international good practice and can be adapted to EORE in RCM.

The delivery of EORE messages during land release is the starting point for EORE in RCM.

- When land is released, EORE/community liaison teams should ensure that communities are confident about using the land and that they understand the residual risk and their related responsibilities.

- In a context of residual contamination, the most important trigger events for EORE are likely to be new items of explosive ordnance being found or incidents / accidents involving explosive ordnance occurring. They should lead to the conduct of EORE for the people involved in the events and, potentially, for a wider audience.
It is important to develop tailored EORE materials, messages, and means of delivery. Although in-person sessions for the broader population may not always be necessary, consideration should be given as to whether the provision of direct sessions to particular groups at risk would be effective and efficient.

In the event that EORE messages are not sufficient to promote safe behaviour, then the risks need to be addressed another way, for example, through alternative safety activities.

**Monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning in relation to explosive ordnance risk education in residual contamination management**

With fewer people at risk and, therefore, fewer EORE activities being implemented in RCM, it can be expected that monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning (MEAL) in relation to EORE becomes a less complicated task.

> Nevertheless, MEAL in relation to EORE in RCM should be subject to a designated mandate.

> The mandated body should predominantly ensure that changes of circumstances are detected and that, if necessary, EORE approaches are adapted.

**Capacities and training in explosive ordnance risk education in residual contamination management**

The transition of EORE to RCM also requires a needs and capacity assessment to define the EORE capacity and any related training required in RCM.

> The oversight and the delivery of EORE in RCM may be allocated to other government agencies that do not necessarily have EORE expertise, such as first responders or local authorities.

> Consequently, the entity responsible for the oversight of EORE must have not only management but also training capabilities.

> Training for agencies and individuals that deliver EORE needs to be effective but limited to the basics, as EORE may not be their primary and priority task.

The insights and considerations presented in this practical guide show that the transition from a mine action programme to RCM requires reflection and planning, which should start as soon as possible. The planning process needs to include the above-mentioned key considerations, but most importantly it needs to examine the root causes of the unsafe behaviour. Wherever there is evidence that unsafe behaviour cannot be altered through EORE, alternative measures to ensure people’s safety should be considered.
INTRODUCTION

It is possible that, during the land release process, not all explosive ordnance is identified and removed. The remaining explosive ordnance constitutes ‘residual contamination’ and poses a residual risk. This residual risk is managed using the same evidence-based principle of ‘all reasonable effort’ that is applied during the land release process. An important consideration in risk management, both during land release and in RCM, is the provision, to groups that are at risk, of information and education concerning the threat posed by the explosive ordnance.

The general expectation is that RCM, including the potential provision of EORE, is likely to require fewer resources than a full-scale mine action programme. Within a national system, RCM may also include the transfer of responsibilities to actors other than those previously involved in EORE. The delivery of a suitable EORE component within RCM therefore requires the development of appropriate institutional frameworks and tools. The planning process should begin as soon as there is enough information to give an indication of the future needs in terms of RCM. This information is usually available when a mine action programme has reached a certain stage of maturity.

This guide gives an overview of current EORE practices in selected South-East Asian countries. It highlights key considerations and offers recommendations related to the planning, implementation and monitoring of EORE in RCM. Although the guide focuses on South-East Asian countries, the recommendations may be applicable for other countries entering the transition to RCM.

Twelve male and 13 female key informants from 18 authorities and organisations in Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Thailand and Vietnam contributed to this guide by participating in interviews, a mapping exercise and an online survey. The four countries were selected for this guide owing to the maturity of their mine action programmes, the diversity of the stakeholders involved and the wide range of EORE approaches applied.

The study also looked into practices applied in countries that have, at least partly, completed the land release process and are in transition, or have completed their transition, to RCM. Approaches applied in Angola, Croatia, Lebanon, Mozambique, Nepal and Zambia, therefore, also informed the key considerations presented in this guide.

Many countries managing contamination from World War I and World War II or running their own training and testing activities have not applied a formal and systematic land release process. Nevertheless, their remaining contamination is similar to residual contamination as defined in the IMAS, and some of their experiences offer interesting insights. For that reason, practices applied in Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (United Kingdom) were also considered in the development of this guide.

Note: For ease of reading, references in this guide are limited to footnotes that provide information from external sources. Any mention of the IMAS and Technical Notes for Mine Action, however, are not subject to a footnote. Where no reference is given, the information has been provided by one or more of the 25 key informants from the four South-East Asian countries or gleaned during the desk study.
2. PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE RISK EDUCATION IN RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION MANAGEMENT

The planning of EORE should always start with formative research. One of the many purposes of formative research is to understand who the groups at risk are, the best means of approaching them and the messages that should be conveyed to them. It is equally important to plan how EORE in RCM will be embedded in government and societal structures and what legal and normative frameworks are best suited to the inclusion of EORE requirements.

IDENTIFICATION OF GROUPS AT RISK

Current practice in South-East Asian countries

Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Vietnam all reported using predefined indicators to identify groups at risk in a more or less systematic way and to prioritise EORE activities. The indicators related to the extent and type of the contamination, incidents and accidents involving explosive ordnance, previous land release activities and demographic and socio-economic statistics (such as, in Cambodia, data from the Identification of Poor Households Programme1).

In Thailand, the groups that have been identified as being at risk are communities living in proximity to concentrated contamination and people transiting through those areas.

Men and boys who engage in farming activities, cultivate new land and/or deliberately engage with explosive ordnance (by collecting or playing or tampering with them) are identified as the main groups at risk in all four South-East Asian countries. They are consequently also the main target group for EORE activities.

Although evidence-based mechanisms are in place and indicators have been defined, the analysis of data in support of the identification of groups at risk could be improved. During preparation of this guide, it was reported that important trends (such as a sudden increase in accidents after floods) often go unnoticed or are not sufficiently addressed in the planning of EORE activities.


COUNTRY EXAMPLES: Identification of groups at risk

In Switzerland, there is residual contamination on former training grounds of the armed forces. These areas are predominantly located in mountainous terrain, publicly accessible and have become popular as outdoor and leisure destinations.

The armed forces systematically analysed data collected from the national unexploded ordnance hotline and from explosive ordnance disposal callouts. It was evident that an increasing number of items of explosive ordnance were being reported in mountainous areas during the peak hiking season (July to September). The data also showed increasingly unsafe behaviour by civilians, such as moving and collecting of pieces of explosive ordnance.

The armed forces therefore decided to launch a national TV and social media campaign targeting those who engaged in outdoor activities. The campaign was run in spring before the beginning of the outdoor season.

Click here to watch the Swiss campaign.
Ideas for residual contamination management from South-East Asian countries

The representatives of South-East Asian countries participating in the study believed that women, girls, boys and men are most at risk from residual contamination when they:

- Engage in livelihood activities (such as farming or the collection of wood) or deliberately manipulate explosive ordnance in areas where the land has not been used previously.
- Engage in activities that take place below the depth addressed during clearance activities (e.g., private or commercial construction of houses, wells and other buildings) or when changes are made to the use of agricultural land.

Current practice in residual contamination management

In countries that engage in RCM, target groups include farmers, children, construction workers, people who engage in outdoor activities and souvenir hunters. What many of the countries have in common is that the groups that are at risk are reportedly well known. Nevertheless, there is only very limited data analysis to back up this allegedly common knowledge with evidence. Exceptions are Switzerland, and to a certain extent, Canada, which both use data analysis to shape EORE activities.

Several reasons have been given for the limited data analysis, as follows:

- In some countries (e.g., France), responsibilities for RCM are allocated to a variety of agencies and organisations. Sometimes (e.g., in Germany), their responsibilities differ geographically. This complicates information exchange, which is not institutionalised in most countries. It is therefore difficult to obtain comprehensive data for analysis.
- Many organisations and institutions that play a role in RCM (such as in explosive ordnance disposal spot tasks and clearance) do not have a mandate for EORE. Data analysis to identify groups at risk is therefore not a priority or not conducted.
- As accidents happen rarely, the identification and education of groups at risk is not perceived as a necessity. The residual risk related to explosive ordnance is seen as being tolerable.

COUNTRY EXAMPLES:

Incorporation of explosive ordnance risk education in government and societal structures

In Cambodia, EORE is integrated in activities related to implementation of the country's Village and Commune Safety Policy, which aims to reduce crime and violence. The Cambodian Police, at the same time as briefing citizens about the policy, conducts EORE.

Incorporation in development and conservation initiatives:

In the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 30,000 people live in a national park that is known to be contaminated with explosive ordnance. Humanity & Inclusion conducted mine action activities there that included EORE and clearance, in cooperation with the national park authority and the Wildlife Conservation Society. In addition to the people who lived in and around the area learning about safer behaviour, new sources of income opened up for the local communities in ecotourism, which also helps protect the precious habitat in the park.

Incorporation in health initiatives and community structures:

In Thailand, EORE is being incorporated in health briefings given by village health volunteers. Thailand also engages community leaders to spread EORE messages. As such leaders are chosen by formal elections, their reputation matters and they are willing to be involved in ensuring the safety of the people in their community.

Incorporation in the activities of political groups:

In Vietnam, EORE is part of the agenda of some Communist Party unions. They provide community based EORE under the oversight of mine action organisations.
Key recommendations related to the identification of groups at risk as part of residual contamination management

Recommendation 1:
Existing indicators used in data analysis should be reviewed as they may have to be further developed and/or adapted for the identification of groups at risk from residual contamination.

It is proposed that the identification of groups at risk as part of RCM start with the following analysis:

- What is the residual contamination (e.g. deep buried bombs, explosive ordnance scattered on the surface or other);
- Where is the residual contamination (its geographic location, on land / in water, on the surface / subsurface, at what depth and so on)?;
- Which of the activities conducted where residual contamination is present entail a risk to those involved (e.g. fishing, the construction of houses and so on)?;
- Who are the people (data disaggregated by age and gender) who undertake these activities, when and why?

Recommendation 2:
To facilitate comprehensive data analysis:

- Data collected during ongoing mine action activities should provide the precise information required;
- Those responsible for the identification of groups at risk should have access to the data collected during mine action activities;
- Mechanisms should be in place to monitor people’s use of land.

Recommendation 3:
The identification of groups at risk from residual contamination should be recognised as:

- A distinct mandate, a responsibility for which is allocated to a specific agency / unit / person.
- An ongoing task that requires the continual monitoring of the identified indicators to detect any changes in circumstances that might create new / different groups at risk.

INCORPORATION OF EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE RISK EDUCATION IN GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETAL STRUCTURES

Current practice in South-East Asian countries

Having delivered various forms of EORE over the years, Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Thailand and Vietnam all reported that, in general, people are well educated in terms of what constitutes safe and unsafe behaviour.

It was also observed that, in some cases, there is fatigue among groups at-risk in relation to attending EORE sessions. That said, it is believed that groups at risk should receive EORE regularly as a reminder and to ensure that individuals who have not benefited from EORE previously are informed.

To save resources and promote sustainable mechanisms, different approaches to incorporating EORE in existing government and societal structures have been explored in South-East Asia. EORE has been incorporated in:

- School curricula and religious education programmes;
- Broader safety policies or health, development or conservation initiatives;
- The regular activities of influential members of and volunteers from civil society and political groups;
- Existing community and village structures, networks and mechanisms;
- Existing family and community group hierarchies.

In all these examples of existing societal structures in which EORE has been incorporated, the responsibility for the delivery (but not necessarily the planning and oversight) of EORE should shift to the sectors, agencies, organisations and groups concerned.
Ideas for residual contamination management from South-East Asian countries

The representatives of South-East Asian countries participating in the study believed that national and provincial governments should play a major role in the planning and implementation of EORE activities. They were also of the view that existing community structures and networks should be used to ensure that the EORE provided meets local requirements. It was also proposed that existing civil society organisations could play a role in EORE in RCM, although there may be a need to determine the related obligations and requirements to ensure that the organisations are committed to conducting the EORE activities in the long term.

Current practice in residual contamination management

In many countries, there are no designated institutions with the responsibility for EORE. EORE is therefore not incorporated in government or societal structures. Despite this, it has been reported that people in those countries ‘just know’ about the risks associated with explosive ordnance and on the whole behave in a safe manner. There are several reasons for this, as follows:

- The contamination remaining is mainly concentrated in areas that are geographically well defined, and people residing in those areas have learned to live with the risk. For example, it is reported that farmers in Belgium discover items of explosive ordnance fairly regularly during their daily work. There seems to be local knowledge about safe behaviour that has been built up through experience and information exchange among the people living there.

- Belgium and Germany have reported that they use mass media to pass safety messages to the public whenever journalists request more information about items of explosive ordnance found. This is an activity that seems to increase / maintain the public’s awareness of the risks and can be seen as a sort of incorporation of EORE in the societal structure.

- Croatia has reported that people in provinces in which RCM is undertaken know about the risk of explosive ordnance because they received regular EORE when the land release process was still under way. As a result, and because the main threat has been removed, it is believed that there is no need for further EORE activities.

- The risk posed by residual contamination is managed through legislation and regulations that enforce safe behaviour. For example, in Germany and the United Kingdom, an assessment related to explosive ordnance and other risks must be undertaken before any construction work can begin.

Two other factors came to light as reasons why the incorporation of EORE in government and societal structures is not a priority.

- The remaining risk is considered residual and thus tolerable. Accidents rarely happen, and communication related to other events where the risk is greater, and the impact would also be greater (such as natural disasters), is considered more important.

- More intense and proactive communication related to the risk posed by residual contamination could lead to that risk being perceived as greater than it really is and create fear. Such a situation may give rise to unreasonable demands on the government to remove the remaining contamination.

Some countries that engage in RCM, however, do integrate EORE, at least to some extent, in government structures.

- In Angola, the draft RCM transition plan clearly allocates responsibility for EORE to the police, which will also be responsible for explosive ordnance disposal spot tasks.

- In Canada, the government manages residual contamination on former armed forces training and testing grounds. The country’s UXO Legacy Sites Program uses multiple risk mitigation strategies to protect civilians, including formal risk assessments, the provision of expert advice to landowners, survey and clearance and public outreach. Public outreach is often seen as often being the most effective risk mitigation measure.

- In Nepal, the government allocates part of its budget to EORE, and security agencies have the mandate to implement the activities.

- In Switzerland, an EORE mandate is not allocated to any of the agencies involved in RCM. Nevertheless, the armed forces and the federal agency responsible for some of the contaminated areas proactively implement EORE activities. This is done out of a moral obligation and with a view to protecting reputation of the armed forces.

- In Zambia, where land release was completed in 2010, the Zambian Mine Action Centre still exists and is mandated to implement EORE activities.
Key recommendations related to the incorporation of explosive ordnance risk education in government and societal structures as part of residual contamination management.

**Recommendation 1:**
To ensure its sustainability in RCM, EORE should be incorporated in the government structure. This implies:
- That, within the government, EORE is recognised as a specific mandate and allocated to a particular agency. This agency does not necessarily have to be a government institution;
- That the government allocates funding for implementation of the mandate.

**Recommendation 2:**
For efficiency and the best use of available resources, EORE should be incorporated in societal structures. This can be done, for example, through:
- The integration of EORE into existing frameworks, initiatives and policies (e.g. in the construction, development and health sectors);
- The allocation of EORE responsibilities to key players and influencers (e.g. community leaders or interest groups).

**Recommendation 3:**
For all EORE initiatives conducted as part of RCM, funding and oversight of the activities should be guaranteed.

The selected South-East Asian countries already have a range of effective and innovative initiatives in place to incorporate EORE in government or societal structures. Any of these initiatives may work well in the context of RCM, but funding and oversight are key.

**Recommendation 4:**
The extent to which EORE is incorporated in government and societal structures should align with the nature of the residual risk. For example, the integration of EORE into a school’s curriculum may be appropriate for a limited time in a newly populated area or in an area where returnees have settled after conflict-related displacement. It may not, however, be necessary to integrate EORE in school curricula nationwide.

**Recommendation 5:**
The long-term implications of the incorporation of EORE in government and societal structures should be carefully considered. Any initiative should remain flexible enough to be adapted if the circumstances and the need for EORE change.

**COUNTRY EXAMPLES:**
**Incorporation of explosive ordnance risk education in government and societal structures, continued**

In Nepal, there is modest residual contamination as result of a decade-long conflict that ended with a peace agreement in 2006. This agreement included a mine action component paving the way for future activities.

As of 2007, the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction acted as the mine action focal point of the government and received funds for EORE and other mine action activities. The Nepalese mine action programme was thus nationally owned from the outset.

The Nepalese Army had cleared all known minefields by 2011. Nevertheless, accidents (mostly involving improvised explosive devices) continue to occur in many regions of the country. EORE is seen as an important way of mitigating the risks that they pose.

Security agencies continue to deliver EORE as part of their mandate, in part thanks to the continuous engagement of Ban Landmines Campaign Nepal, which has also trained district representatives to conduct EORE. This shows how the timely incorporation of EORE in the structure of the government (including the allocation of responsibilities and funds) can help ensure the sustainability of EORE long after clearance obligations have been met.
INCORPORATION OF EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE RISK EDUCATION IN LEGAL AND NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKS

Current practice in South-East Asian countries

Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Thailand have a duty to conduct EORE as part of their obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. All three countries have included relevant objectives in mine action strategies and workplans.

In Cambodia and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, mine action, including EORE, is incorporated in the broader development framework and has been identified as an additional, eighteenth, sustainable development goal.

In Vietnam, EORE is acknowledged at the government level as an integral part of mine action activities. The responsibility for the management of EORE has been allocated to the Vietnamese National Mine Action Centre. Similar decrees and orders allocating the responsibility for coordinating EORE to a government authority also exist in Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Thailand.

The Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Vietnam have legislation in place related to the survey and clearance of construction sites. Restrictions on scrap metal collection exist in Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Vietnam.

Despite these regulations, EORE is not anchored in the national law of any of the countries in a way that guarantees its continuation in the context of RCM.

Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Thailand and Vietnam also have a normative framework for EORE activities in place. This includes national standards, guidelines, training manuals and standard operating procedures that are based on the IMAS.

Ideas for residual contamination management from South-East Asian countries

Representatives of the South-East Asian countries participating in the study believed that regulations related to disaster risk reduction, health and safety and, to a lesser extent, to human security and development/ construction would be most suited to the integration of EORE requirements for RCM. Participants also believed that the existing normative frameworks, with some adaptation, would work well in the context of RCM.

COUNTRY EXAMPLES:
Incorporation of explosive ordnance risk education in legal and normative frameworks

The Construction Law of Vietnam requires any planning activity related to construction to take into consideration a range of health and safety risks, including ‘the safety of works, human lives and health and property’ and ‘fire and explosion prevention and fighting’.

Although not mentioned explicitly, this includes the requirement to assess, and where necessary to address, risks relating to explosive ordnance.

In addition, one of the decrees on the management of construction projects that supports the law clearly states that the construction phase is to include ‘demining (if any)’.

The example shows how the management of explosive ordnance risks can be integrated in legal frameworks that will last beyond the completion of the land release process.

---

2 In the context of this study, the legal framework is taken to mean the documents that outline the legal obligations directing mine action and its functioning, including EORE activities and their organisation. Examples of such documents are laws, decrees, orders and contracts. The normative framework refers to documents that translate legal obligations into mine action work requirements, including in the EORE sector. Examples of such documents are policies, strategies, standards and guidelines.


6 Vietnam is currently drafting a mine action law.
Current practice in residual contamination management

Although Angola, Croatia, Nepal and Zambia have all undertaken (or are still engaged in) a formal and systematic land release process, their approaches to the frameworks applicable for EORE in RCM differs, as follows:

- **Angola**, while still conducting land release in most of its provinces, has transitioned to RCM in a few provinces. This was done following a draft transition plan, which is currently under review. The plan is to engage in RCM, including EORE, under the existing legal and normative frameworks for mine action, with the required amendments.
- **In Croatia**, the legal and normative frameworks used for land release do not explicitly apply to RCM. While the responsibility for explosive ordnance spot tasks in the context of RCM is allocated to the police, EORE is not an activity that is recognised, planned and actively implemented in areas with residual contamination.
- **In Nepal**, mandates and responsibilities within mine action are based on obligations agreed in a peace agreement signed in 2006. Despite the completion of mine clearance in 2011, these mandates and responsibilities are still valid and allocated the Ministry of Defence still recognises a duty to conduct EORE.
- **Zambia** implements explosive ordnance spot tasks, EORE and victim assistance in the context of residual contamination. The Mine Action Centre coordinates these activities following its legal obligations under the ‘Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines Act’.7 This act was implemented in areas with residual contamination.

In contrast, **Austria, Germany** and the **United Kingdom** have not applied formal and systematic land release processes in accordance with the IMAS. In these countries, the legal and normative frameworks relating to explosive ordnance risks are linked with health and safety obligations. Only Germany and the United Kingdom, however, have some legally binding regulations in place, and these are for the construction sector. They refer vaguely to EORE as one possible risk mitigation measure.

In **Canada**, legal responsibilities relating to UXO on legacy sites are for the most part derived from common law (including the use of legal precedent).

In **Switzerland**, frameworks related to the mitigation of risks from explosive ordnance, but not explicitly to EORE, are linked to legislation and regulations concerning the environment and human security.

---


---

**COUNTRY EXAMPLES:**

**Incorporation of explosive ordnance risk education in legal and normative frameworks, continued**

The Government of **Angola** has drafted a strategy that outlines how the country plans to transition to RCM.

The strategy clarifies that the existing regulations related to mine action will remain valid at a global level, with RCM abiding by all international laws and treaties to which Angola is a signatory. It also states that, in principle, international humanitarian law will be followed.

Furthermore, the strategy proposes that RCM in Angola be embedded in an established government institution, the activities of which will be guided by the available laws and regulations.

Although such assertions require further clarification, it is good practice, or rather a necessity, to plan all aspects of the transition to RCM together, including the legal aspects.

Angola has also drafted a new chapter of its national standards explaining the RCM policy for Angola. It mentions EORE as one possible risk mitigation measure.

The existing national standards will be reviewed and adapted accordingly to the context of RCM.

In **Germany**, there is a set of construction guidelines for explosive ordnance clearance that guides procedures on government-owned construction sites. These guidelines require thorough assessment of explosive ordnance risks. Similar regulations are in place for commercial / private construction sites, although requirements differ from one federal state to another.

As a rule, investors are responsible for contracting commercial companies to undertake risk assessments and, if necessary, to implement appropriate risk mitigation measures. Safety briefings, rather than EORE activities, can be one of the possible measures.

In the **United Kingdom**, the construction regulations relating to health and safety require contractors to ensure that construction work can be carried out, to the extent reasonably practicable, without risk to the health and safety of any person. This includes the requirement to conduct risk assessments of a potential threat from explosive ordnance.

The Construction Industry Research and Information Association offers guidelines for UXO risk assessments. The recommendations for risk mitigation include the option of ‘training’ by ‘alerting site workers’ (safety briefings).
Key recommendations related to the incorporation of explosive ordnance risk education in legal and normative frameworks as part of residual contamination management

Recommendation 1:
In a context of RCM, where resources will likely be more limited than for full-fledged mine action activities, priority should be given to the conduct of tasks for which a legal obligation exists. If it is not yet in place, a legal framework should be established to ensure that EORE is a recognised component of RCM. If legal obligations relating to EORE are already in place, there should be an evaluation of whether they will still be valid upon the fulfilment of the current obligations (such as those under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention or the Convention on Cluster Munitions) and despite a potential change in responsibilities.

Recommendation 2:
Existing legislation should be examined to ascertain whether it can be used in the transfer of the responsibilities related to EORE as part of RCM. For example, regulations concerning health and safety in the construction sector may include the requirement to conduct risk assessments related to residual contamination and highlight the importance of EORE as a possible mitigation measure. Laws and regulations related to the environment, disaster risk reduction or human security/human rights may also be suitable as the basis for the inclusion of EORE requirements in RCM.

Recommendation 3:
The existing normative framework, including standards and standard operating procedures, should be reviewed, and adapted to the context of RCM. Guidelines for EORE in RCM should be based on the needs of groups identified as being at risk and on the resources foreseen to be available for EORE activities.

If it is not yet in place, a legal framework should be established to ensure that EORE is a recognised component of RCM.
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE RISK EDUCATION MESSAGES AND MEANS OF DELIVERY

Current practice in South-East Asian countries

EORE messages in the South-East Asian countries that participated in the study address different types of contamination and are tailored to the specific needs of women, men, boys and girls.

Messages include information related to the appearance of different types of explosive ordnance; where they can be found; what effect they have; what the consequences of accidents are; what constitutes safe and unsafe behaviour; and what is deemed appropriate behaviour when explosive ordnance is encountered.

EORE is conducted either in support of other mine action activities, as a stand-alone activity or integrated in school curricula / broader information campaigns relating to security or health, for example. Activities are implemented by the EORE teams of mine action organisations and the authorities or by trained individuals, including teachers, health workers, security staff, volunteers and influencers.

EORE activities usually follow a plan that has been agreed with the national and / or local authorities. These plans enable the coordination of EORE and its systematic delivery to groups at risk. During the study, however, it was reported that the planning and coordination of EORE in emergencies (for example, after floods that are suspected of having washed explosive ordnance to the surface in new places) could be improved. Monitoring mechanisms to track events that require the conduct of emergency EORE are not in place or are insufficient, and the delivery of emergency EORE often depends on the initiative of mine action operators.

The media used to transmit EORE messages include printed materials, radio and TV broadcasts, information websites, social media messages and videos, text messages on mobile applications, puppet shows and games. The use of social media was discussed intensively among the key informants; while such projects show good results, it is also assumed that those who consume digital messages are potentially less at risk because of their ready access to information.

A mutual concern is the effectiveness of current EORE approaches as some groups at-risk, despite being aware of the threat, continue engaging in risky activities. A reason for this is livelihood conditions that enforce unsafe behaviour to make a living. Participating stakeholders emphasised that it is important to combine EORE with measures to improve at-risk groups’ life circumstances and/or to offer them alternative sources of income.

Ideas for residual contamination management from South-East Asian countries

South-East Asian countries participating in the study believed that the discovery of new items of explosive ordnance and related accidents were important trigger events for EORE in a context of residual contamination. Among the messages that were deemed important to pass to groups at risk were not to touch items of explosive ordnance; how to recognise and report items of explosive ordnance; and the effect of detonating items of explosive ordnance.

In-person sessions, followed up with messages on the radio, TV and in print were mentioned as suitable means of delivery of EORE messages in RCM. EORE on the Internet and in social media, although mentioned too, were perceived as less suitable.

Current practice in residual contamination management

As suggested by the key informants from the four South-East Asian countries, EORE activities in countries that apply RCM are triggered mainly when items of explosive ordnance are found or accidents happen. In Belgium and Germany, EORE is limited to the transmission of safety messages through mass media when they report on the discovery of items of explosive ordnance or related accidents. In Switzerland, a software application that can be used to report items of explosive ordnance contains safety messages. Canada and Switzerland also conduct public outreach based on data collected in relation to the discovery of items of explosive ordnance and related accidents.

While the key informants believed direct sessions to be the most important means of conducting EORE in RCM, the situation in countries that engage in RCM looks somewhat different. Direct sessions are an exception rather than the standard solution. This is mainly because no mandate for EORE has been allocated, and hence no resources / budget are available for in-person sessions. Furthermore, such sessions are not seen as necessary as there is only a residual risk for isolated groups of people. Where direct sessions are conducted, these are tailored to the needs of groups at risk. For example, Canada conducts in-person sessions in schools in areas where pupils have been involved in accidents, and safety briefings for construction workers are conducted in Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

There are exceptions, however, where in-person EORE sessions are held for the broader public. In Nepal, direct sessions are conducted regularly by the security forces, and, in Zambia, the government works with community focal points and uses its explosive ordnance disposal teams to conduct face-to-face EORE when items of explosive ordnance are found.
In Lebanon, the handover of cleared land is not the end of engagement with the community, but the start of the delivery of EORE messages related to RCM. EORE teams go back to communities after a certain period of time to ensure that the people are confident about using the released land, and to remind them of their responsibilities and the residual risk.

The EORE messages passed in countries that engage in RCM are similar to those suggested by the key informants. In general, the main message is simplified to ‘do not touch; report’, combined with information on how to report an incident. For construction workers, EORE includes recommendations for safe behaviour or detailed instructions related to restrictions on work processes. The delivery of EORE is rarely a stand-alone activity. Often, it is an integral part of risk assessments related to land use.

COUNTRY EXAMPLES:
Explosive ordnance risk education messages and means of delivery

In Cambodia, community liaison teams of the Halo Trust established strong relationships with village chiefs. This led to the provision of EORE in combination with diabetes screening, thus improving people’s circumstances in multiple ways. People who tested positive for diabetes received further support. The example shows how EORE can be combined with activities that improve people’s livelihood in general.

In Vietnam, a tiered approach to the delivery of EORE is used through its integration into school curricula. While certain topics are a mandatory part of every school curriculum, each province can choose to add other topics depending on the provincial context and priorities. These might be related to health, the environment or the threat of UXO, for example. This flexible approach allows local authorities to pass appropriate EORE messages in schools, including in areas that are forecast to experience rapid population growth and those that are expanding to occupy previously unused land.

In Switzerland, items of explosive ordnance can be reported to the police, via a hotline, by email or through an app. The app contains safety messages, including a video on how items can be safely marked.

In Belgium and Germany, whenever possible, mass media is used to transmit EORE messages to the public when items of explosive ordnance are found. Such reporting reaches a large audience and is cost-effective. The example below is an article about a popular recreational activity in both countries that involves the use of magnets to ‘fish’ objects out of bodies of water. Frequently, such objects turn out to be UXO from World War I or II.

In areas with residual contamination in Zambia, there are networks of trusted, volunteer, community focal points. They are responsible for reporting the discovery of items of explosive ordnance, conducting EORE and reporting accidents related to explosive ordnance. Teachers are also trained to conduct EORE in schools in areas that have been identified as high risk.

In Zambia, EORE is combined with explosive ordnance disposal spot tasks. The teams consist of one person qualified in explosive ordnance disposal and two support members who conduct both EORE and a victim needs assessment.

The practices used in Zambia are a good example of targeted and tailored solutions that economise on resources.
Key recommendations related to explosive ordnance risk education messages and means of delivery as part of residual contamination management.

**Recommendation 1:**
EORE educates people about safe and unsafe behaviour. If unsafe behaviour continues despite the conduct of EORE, the reasons for it should be ascertained. Root cause analysis helps identify why the unsafe behaviour takes place. If the likelihood of unsafe behaviour occurring is unlikely to be reduced through appropriate EORE messages and means of delivery (for example because people believe that there is a benefit to be drawn from the unsafe behaviour), then the risk needs to be addressed another way (for example, through the provision of alternative benefits).

**Recommendation 2:**
Any release of land is an opportunity to facilitate a smooth transition to RCM. EORE should be used to ensure that communities are confident about using the released land; understand their responsibilities; are educated about the residual risk; and know who will be responsible for the RCM.

**Recommendation 3:**
The discovery of items of explosive ordnance and incidents / accidents involving explosive ordnance are trigger events for the delivery of EORE in RCM. Upon the trigger, EORE should happen fast and efficiently, for example in person by trained teams or through safety messages conveyed by the mass media covering the event.

**Recommendation 4:**
In the context of residual contamination, in-person sessions for the broader population should not be necessary. Consideration, however, should be given to whether the provision of direct sessions to particular groups at-risk (such as construction workers) would be effective and efficient. The messages and language used in EORE for such groups, whether delivered in person or through other means, such as a website, should be tailored to their needs.

Discovery of new items of explosive ordnance and related accidents were important trigger events for EORE in a context of residual contamination. Among the messages that were deemed important to pass to groups at risk were not to touch items of explosive ordnance; how to recognise and report items of explosive ordnance; and the effect of detonating items of explosive ordnance.
3. MONITORING, EVALUATION, ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEARNING IN RELATION TO EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE RISK EDUCATION IN RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION MANAGEMENT

MEAL in relation to EORE aims to ensure the relevance and quality of the activities implemented and of the related outcomes and the achievement of the stated objectives. MEAL results should be used to identify how to improve the overall performance of EORE and to ensure that the activities implemented are effective, efficient, coherent, sustainable and have a positive impact.

Current practice in South-East Asian countries

The representatives of the South-East Asian countries participating in this study confirmed that the EORE activities currently taking place in their countries are monitored. In general, this includes internal monitoring at the level of the implementing organisation / agency and external monitoring by the national authorities. Monitoring consists of field visits and analysis of the data collected.

National authorities, as a minimum, monitor EORE in terms of the number of beneficiaries, where and when they were reached and how. The nature of the explosive ordnance threat and the types of incidents that occur are indicators used to identify groups at risk and to guide the long-term planning of EORE. This information is used less to prioritise emergency EORE or to evaluate the performance of ongoing EORE activities.

The evaluation of EORE activities and the measurement of behaviour change was a major discussion point among the key informants from South-East Asian countries. It is well known that, sometimes, people display unsafe behaviour despite receiving EORE multiple times. Mine action operators sometimes conduct knowledge, attitude and practice surveys and other such studies to learn more about the reasons for the risk-taking behaviour and how it can best be addressed.

In Cambodia and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, regular meetings of a technical working group are held to share lessons learned. Nevertheless, none of the South-East Asian countries that participated in the study systematically evaluates EORE activities at a national level in a way that would allow in-depth conclusions to be drawn to feed into the planning and improvement of future EORE.

COUNTRY EXAMPLES:
Monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning

In the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, the national authority, together with the United Nations Development Programme, conducted a knowledge, attitude and practice survey to obtain a better understanding of the reasons for risk taking behaviour.

The study showed that, in general, the participants had a high level of knowledge (particularly about how to report the presence of UXO) and a good idea of safe behaviour. Much of this can be attributed to EORE. At the same time, some victims of explosive ordnance who participated in the survey seemed not to have been informed and had not learned safe behaviour.

The survey showed that most EORE activities are conducted in schools and local communities, with little use of mass media. It showed that there was the potential to improve the clarity of the material used and to update EORE in schools. Other potential reasons for limited effectiveness that came to light included a lack of targeted and tailored EORE messages for groups at risk and the conduct of EORE sessions during working hours.

Such surveys can assist in the evaluation of the impact of EORE. Through analysis of the triggers of unsafe behaviour, it can enable better tailoring and targeting of EORE activities also in RCM.
Ideas for residual contamination management from South-East Asian countries

The representatives of the South-East Asian countries participating in the study believed that MEAL in relation to EORE activities in RCM should be the responsibility of the national or provincial government. They also believed, although to a lesser extent, that community networks and national and international NGOs could play a role.

Current practice in residual contamination management

In most countries that engage in RCM, MEAL in relation to EORE activities are not carried out systematically. The main reasons for this are that EORE and related tasks are not subject to a specific mandate. In most cases, EORE is not conducted proactively in accordance with a plan and, where there are no plans, there are no objectives and no way of monitoring and evaluating progress towards their achievement. That said, there are two important points to be made:

- Some countries have a fairly good idea of changes in the use of their land. Such changes are restricted by environmental regulations, and land use is recorded in national registers. Although the available data is not monitored proactively at present, countries with such a register agree that doing so would help them plan and tailor their EORE activities.
- All countries acknowledged that information from reports on explosive ordnance and incidents / accidents involving explosive ordnance is crucial for the planning of EORE. Efforts are being made to systematise the monitoring and analysis of such data. Many countries benefit from and rely on the well-organised and systematic data-collection mechanisms of first responders.

All countries acknowledged that information from reports on explosive ordnance and incidents / accidents involving explosive ordnance is crucial for the planning of EORE. Changes in land use is also an important consideration to determine whether EORE is needed.
Key recommendations related to monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning in relation to explosive ordnance risk education as part of residual contamination management.

Recommendation 1:
MEAL should be part of EORE in RCM. The scope of EORE in RCM and the resources available are likely to be more limited, which means that a full-scale MEAL set-up is not required. MEAL in relation to EORE in RCM should focus on the monitoring of the circumstances in which the items of explosive ordnance were found and whether there have been any events that may require EORE to be conducted. Where feasible, land use, population movement and environmental events that change the residual risk from explosive ordnance should also be monitored. EORE activities too should be monitored, but potentially only with basic activity-level indicators, such as what was done to address the residual risk; when and where; how was it done; who was the focus of the activity (data disaggregated by sex, age and disability); and how many benefited from it.

Recommendation 2:
Relevant reporting / data-collection mechanisms should be in place to monitor the circumstances in which items of explosive ordnance are found and in which related events they occurred.

- **Reports of items of explosive ordnance found.** Such reports should state:
  - Who reported the item (data disaggregated by sex, age and disability) during what activity and when (day / date / time);
  - What item was found, in what condition and in what location (geographical position; on land, in water, on the surface or sub-surface and at what depth);
  - Whether the person reporting the item behaved safely;
  - Whether the person had previously received EORE and, if so, how many times and by what means.
- **Reports of incidents / accidents involving items of explosive ordnance.** Such reports should state:
  - Who was involved in the event (data disaggregated by sex, age and disability);
  - What type of explosive ordnance caused the accident;
  - What activity caused the accident (date / time);
  - Why the person / people involved in the event were conducting the activity;
  - Whether the person / people was / were aware of a threat related to explosive ordnance, whether he / she / they had previously received EORE and, if so, how many times and by what means.

Recommendation 3:
MEAL related to EORE in RCM should be subject to a designated mandate. The mandate should lie with the authority / entity responsible for the planning and coordination of EORE in RCM. If the same institution is also responsible for the implementation of EORE activities, it is good practice to allocate the responsibility for MEAL to an external monitoring body to ensure independence.

Recommendation 4:
Whenever EORE in RCM is conducted, safeguarding measures should be in place for all the groups / individuals targeted. Such measures may include a hotline number, a feedback form and a trusted focal point in the community.
4. CAPACITY AND TRAINING IN EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE RISK EDUCATION IN RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION MANAGEMENT

A needs and capacity assessment should be conducted to define the EORE capacity needed as part of RCM and any related training required. Identification of the required competencies and skills is a precondition for determining how they can be developed. Only if they are precisely defined can the human and financial resources required for EORE in RCM be calculated and budgeted for.

Current practice in South-East Asia countries

The four South-East Asian countries participating in the study implement a wide range of EORE approaches and follow different internal procedures for developing and maintaining the capacity needed for implementation of EORE.

EORE has been incorporated in societal structures in different ways, which has led to a further diversification of the competences required of personnel specialised in the delivery of and training in EORE.

At the national level, only limited guidance is available on minimum requirements for the development and maintenance of EORE capacities. In general, there is simply a demand that personnel engaged in EORE have the ‘appropriate training and qualifications’.

This situation may reflect a lack of standardisation at the international level. The IMAS do not include competency standards in relation to EORE. Given the diversity of EORE approaches and activities, however, any such standards may need to be equally diverse.

Today, the financial resources needed to develop and maintain EORE capacities are mostly mobilised by operators from various donors. An exception is in Thailand, where EORE activities along the border with Cambodia are exclusively the responsibility of the military and the local authorities, and EORE activities (including the training of personnel) are funded by the Government.

Ideas for residual contamination management from South-East Asian countries

The representatives of the South-East Asian countries participating in the study had different opinions on the development of EORE capacities in RCM. Most believed that national and provincial governments should specify the necessary qualifications and ensure the availability of the resources needed to develop the required capacities. Others, however, expressed the idea that international donors and operators should assist by specifying what EORE capacities are required and by contributing technically and financially to their development.

COUNTRY EXAMPLES: Capacity and training

In Belgium, explosive ordnance disposal interventions are always preceded by a request from the police, and explosive ordnance awareness training is part of the curriculum of the National Police Academy. The training is provided by the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit of the armed forces and aims to increase the police’s capacity to deal with explosive ordnance and to ensure the safety of the public. The same units also provide special awareness sessions to police units in high-risk areas despite not having a specific mandate to do so.

This is an example of the systematic training of first responders to enable them to deal with emergency situations related to explosive ordnance.

In Canada, explosive ordnance disposal spot tasks are the responsibility of the army. In 2005, however, the civilian-run UXO Legacy Sites Program, under the Department of Defence, was established to manage contaminated former training grounds more effectively as a whole. Initially, the programme was staffed by individuals who had expertise in real estate, explosive ordnance and military training. As the programme matured, however, more skill sets were added to increase its effectiveness. The team now includes historians and communications professionals.

This is a good example of how capacities have been adapted on the basis of changing or newly identified needs.
Current practice in residual contamination management

In Canada and Zambia, personnel are recruited specifically to conduct EORE tasks.

In Belgium, France, Germany and Switzerland, the personnel who conduct explosive ordnance spot tasks, survey or clearance also convey ad hoc safety messages, if deemed necessary. By virtue of being qualified in explosive ordnance disposal, survey or clearance, they are deemed to be qualified to conduct EORE.

Despite there not being a recognised and specifically trained EORE capacity in Belgium and Switzerland, in both countries awareness and train-the-trainer activities have been initiated for the police. The aim is to enhance the capacity of the police to identify explosive ordnance, to behave safely and to convey safety messages to the public when items of explosive ordnance are reported to them. In Switzerland, the communication department of the armed forces is responsible for wider public awareness campaigns.

In Nepal, where EORE has been designated a specific mandate of the security forces, personnel are trained specifically to conduct EORE, with advanced training organised jointly by Ban Landmines Campaign Nepal and the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction.

A general observation is that, in some countries, the understanding of EORE in the context of residual contamination is different from that in South-East Asian and elsewhere. South-East Asian countries develop EORE capacities as defined in the IMAS. In countries already engaged in RCM, however, the provision of warnings, safety messages and safety briefings are more common than the implementation of a full-scale EORE programme. This has implications for capacities of and the training required for the personnel responsible for such activities.

Key recommendations related to capacity and training in explosive ordnance risk education as part of residual contamination management

**Recommendation 1:**
The occasions on which full-scale EORE will be required in a residual context should be considered, along with what other means could be used to raise people’s awareness (such as safety briefings for construction workers). Definition of the methodologies to be used is important for the development of training in the different services to be provided.

**Recommendation 2:**
In RCM, when items of explosive ordnance are found or incidents / accidents involving explosive ordnance occur, emergency EORE is likely to be the priority. Agencies acting as first responders (such as the police, explosive ordnance disposal units and emergency medical services) should have the requisite training and thus capacity to deliver this form of EORE. Consideration should also be given to how such training will be conducted, systematically and regularly.

**Recommendation 3:**
Training requirements should be adapted to the situation on the ground. In the context of RCM, where full scaled EORE may not be deployed and agencies and individuals that deliver EORE may have other responsibilities, training requirements might not need to be as comprehensive as in a traditional mine action programme.

**Recommendation 4:**
In RCM, it is unlikely that national and international NGOs will provide EORE resources unless they have an official mandate (and funding). It is therefore recommended that the government take ownership of capacity development for RCM, including EORE.

**Recommendation 5:**
It is likely that the management and oversight of EORE in RCM will be the responsibility of a small unit. The unit may have to plan, implement and coordinate EORE; create and organise EORE material; monitor and evaluate EORE activities; ensure that safeguarding takes place; and develop and conduct training in EORE delivery. To ensure that such a wide range of tasks can be undertaken, well-trained and highly qualified staff should be recruited.
5. CONCLUSION: NEEDS RELATED TO AND PRECONDITIONS FOR EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE RISK EDUCATION AS PART OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

This guide aims to highlight key considerations in the planning, implementation and monitoring of EORE in RCM. Previous chapters have discussed the identification of groups at risk; the incorporation of EORE in government and societal structures; the incorporation of EORE in legal and normative frameworks; considerations related to the messages contained in and the means of delivery of EORE in RCM; and MEAL approaches and the requirement for capacity development and training in relation to an EORE component in RCM.

These chapters have shown that numerous aspects need to be considered in shaping an appropriate EORE component in RCM. Nevertheless, the task should not be perceived as being overwhelming. The study has shown that Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Thailand and Vietnam, as well as many other countries that apply internationally recognised mine action principles, are already in a good position to set up an EORE component as part of RCM and to do so in a timely, yet considered, manner. The following six steps serve as a final recommendation as to the sequencing of considerations in planning a successful transition from full-fledged EORE in mine action to EORE in RCM.

1. Evaluation of the need for an EORE component: The decision as to whether an EORE component is required in RCM should be taken after analysis of the evidence. This evidence is obtained through the identification of the groups at risk. Information related to the remaining threat from explosive ordnance should be used to identify these groups: namely, where the residual threat is and what it is; the activities that are likely to interfere with the residual threat; who the people are (data disaggregated by sex, age and disability) who conduct such activities; and when and why they conduct them (needs assessment). If such an analysis reveals a potential risk, RCM will require an EORE component.

2. Framing of the EORE component: Wherever a mine action programme applies mine action principles, EORE may already be incorporated in a comprehensive legal and normative framework. In addition, in certain mine action programmes, at least some aspects of EORE are likely already to have been integrated into government and societal structures. The planning of EORE in RCM includes assessment of which aspects of the existing frameworks and structures will still be applicable. The incorporation of EORE in government and societal structures needs to be linked with designated mandates. These must be anchored in legal and normative frameworks that are applicable to RCM. Dedicated funding needs to be available to enable EORE to be conducted.

3. Planning of the transition: The transition from a mine action programme to RCM is a task that should not be underestimated. Such a transition takes time and requires planning. Steps 1) and 2) should lead to a clear idea of the nature of the EORE component required as part of RCM. This then needs to be translated into measurable objectives, with a realistic timeline for achieving them. The transition plan should be subject to MEAL to track progress.

4. Sequential implementation of EORE in RCM: The EORE component of RCM may begin in some parts of a country while mine action activities are still ongoing in others. If planned in a timely manner, this is a realistic scenario, particularly when a country follows a sequential approach to completion of the land release process, working, for example, village by village. While it is challenging to apply two approaches, it has a lot of advantages. Capacity development can also be run in sequence and, with that, made more manageable; lessons learned can be used to bring continuous improvement to the ongoing transition process; and the mine action set-up still in place can serve as backup and support for the RCM set-up until it is mature and functions well.

5. Inclusion of MEAL in relation to EORE in RCM: MEAL in relation to EORE should be an integral part of the initial RCM set-up. Such a system should be suitable for the monitoring of changes in circumstances related to the residual threat from explosive ordnance and for the basic-level monitoring and evaluation of the EORE activities conducted. The results of MEAL should be used for the continuous adaptation and improvement of the EORE activities.

6. Specification of capacities and calculation of the required resources: Based on a needs assessment and consideration of how an EORE component is best incorporated in RCM, the capacities, both qualitative and quantitative, required for doing so can be identified. The action needed to build up and maintain these capacities can be estimated, and consequently, the human and financial resources can be calculated.