The importance of survey in implementing CCM Art 4

“It’s the evidence…..”

Atle Karlsen, Deputy Director NPA
Introduction

- There’s no immediate solutions for increasing “productivity” (speed of clearance)
- So, in some of the most affected countries of the world survey will still need to be focus for the foreseeable future, until an estimation of contamination is established and prioritisations conducted
- A risk reduction approach should be used for “emergencies”, but the principles of evidence based survey MUST not be forgotten
Characteristics

• Unexploded cluster submunitions and other CM remnants have several characteristics that lend themselves to structured survey work (This distinguishes cluster munition from most other UXOs)
• What is mostly true, whatever the failure rate, is that if you find one unexploded submunition you should find more
• Records of where bombs were dropped, the intended targets and the content of the CBUs may be of great assistance in understanding the contamination
Characteristics continued

- Cluster bombs make a known and predictable “footprint” on the ground – the unexploded submunitions will almost always be within the boundary of this footprint.
- The “risk” when surveying for cluster munition remnants may vary from country to country, depending on the types of submunitions dropped – but cluster submunitions are not landmines and so survey from inside out is possible in most cases – this may open for a more “aggressive” hunt for evidence.
Starting points

- The starting point for a technical survey (CMRS) can be found through Non-technical survey (NTS), including an analysis of historic data like accidents, previous clearance, villagers testimony – but always through a triangulation of data.

- The determination of a starting point through non-technical survey is normally better when personnel with some technical competence is conducting it.

- Once a starting point has been located a survey team can divide up the area around in a structured manner and start the technical survey – can be physical or strong claim.
Considerations

- CMRS to establish Confirmed Hazardous Area (CHA), in most cases
- Bombing data may be inaccurate and statistics may not be helpful for some countries with old contamination – need to be considered for CCM obligations
- Survey for evidence of contamination, including fragments – but each country context different
- This survey approach builds very much on Land Release principles, making decisions in the field based on information gathered and evidence found - important for effectiveness – this does NOT mean that land should be released through other means than clearance
Different Stages of Cluster Munition Remnants Survey (CMRS) Process

1. Desktop Assessment and review of historical data before IA
2. IA/NTS and data gathering process, Evidence Point for CMRS
3. CMRS systematic search on 50x50m boxes to confirm presence of contamination
4. Establishing CHA after CMRS and report to IMSMA of NRA
5. Confirmed Hazardous Area (CHA) has been tasked for Clearance
6. Clearance completed with 50 m fade out and the land has been released

Norwegian People’s Aid
Lao PDR
UXO Survey and Clearance
NTM Ventiane Office
368 Unit 20, Ban Thatphoeng, Vientiane District
Vientiane Capital
Telephone: 856 21 264 812
Fax: 856 21 264 813
P.O. Box 8106

NPA Laos Program is using high resolution satellite imageries for its Cluster Munition Remnants Survey (CMRS) and for clearance operation. These imageries are intellectual property of NGD (National Geographic Department) and is licensed to NPA.

Disclaimer: NPA makes no warranty, express or implied, related to the accuracy of the content or of the boundary of this map.

NPA is working in partnership with the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) for UXO/RM Action and other stakeholders to eliminate the humanitarian and socio-economic threat posed by ERW in Lao PDR.

Confirmed Hazardous Areas (CHA) identified during CMRS (Cluster Munitions Remnant Survey) conducted by the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). For further information and clarification about survey methodology, please contact NPA country office.

NPA’s Long-term objective: Cluster munition contamination is not an obstacle to socio-economic development in Lao PDR.

Immediate objective: Cluster munition contamination in (NPA operational areas) of Lao PDR is surveyed and mapped, and priority areas cleared.
Desktop Assessment and review of historical data before IA
IA/NTS and data gathering process, Evidence Point for CMRS
CMRS systematic search on 50x50m boxes to confirm presence of contamination
Establishing CHA after CMRS and report to IMSMA of NRA
Confirmed Hazardous Area (CHA) has been tasked for Clearance
Clearance completed with 50m fade out and the land has been released

Summary:
- CHA area size: 71,250 m²
- Clearance area size: 122,785 m²
- Devices found in CMRS: 29
- Devices found in Clearance: 316
- Total devices found: 345
- Intended land use: Agriculture
Large CHAs
SURVEY – Obvious but not yet fully established practice to define CM problem

- Cluster Munition Monitor still records practice of full CMR clearance conducted with no or single cluster munitions found.

- Possible explanations:
  - CHAs (SHAs) in the national databases are not based on good NTS and TS process. Do countries really have an accurate overview of the problem?
  - Operators are clearing the tasks without rigorous operational planning. Do operators really apply the best possible and most efficient effort? Are national standards still treating cluster munition clearance too much like mine clearance or BAC, and not respect the particular characteristics of cluster munitions?
SURVEY – Obvious but not yet fully established practice to define CM problem

• We can appreciate that there is a need for country specific solutions to the CMR problem, but we urge affected states, donors and operators, to assess the following:
  • Is the affected country’s overview based on good non-technical and technical survey establishing CHAs?
  • Do national mine action standards of a particular country focus on finding the CM threat/footprint, rather than clearing polygons that might have been drawn with poor or inaccurate data and without direct evidence?
  • What is country’s key performance criteria (square meters cleared or threat/CHAs removed, or perhaps items/ m2)?
  • Do operators apply/ are they allowed to apply methodology for cluster munition survey/ clearance that are taking into the account the specific characteristics of CMR.
SURVEY – Obvious but not yet fully established practice to define CM problem

- NPA believes that application of CMRS type methodology (modified to accommodate for country specific situations) will further increase the efficiency, even if only applied in operational planning phase by the operators before deploying their clearance resources.
- Affected states should enable the space to discuss the most efficient solutions and encourage operators to focus their expensive clearance efforts on finding the actual threat.
NEW CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATION – Lessons learnt from previous emergency responses

• HRW published a report last week, confirming at least 224 CM strikes in Syria
• As a community, we should all ensure that we learn from previous response to cluster munition contamination and ensure that the remaining threat is removed as quickly, efficiently and safely as possible.
NEW CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATION – Lessons learnt from previous emergency responses

• If only visual search is conducted in the initial response to remove the immediate threat, it should not be labeled as clearance but as **immediate risk reduction measure** only.

• Any items removed and destroyed through this initial effort need to be properly recorded (with as much details as possible) as they are not only representing threat that is removed, but also **evidence** for the next phase when the actual clearance will take place. Proper recording and information management in this phase will enable proper CHAs to be established and enable the most efficient and effective clearance.

• Emergency cannot be an excuse for poor planning, lack of documentation or poor information management – this should already be devised and adopted in the planning stages.
Norwegian People’s Aid